Rebuilding Government Legitimacy in Post-conflict Societies: Case Studies of Nepal and Afghanistan

Adrian Cherney
THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND

11/09/2015
Final Report

1. REPORT DATE **09 SEP 2015**	2. REPORT TYPE **Final**	3. DATES COVERED **28-03-2012 to 27-03-2015**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Rebuilding Government Legitimacy in Post-conflict Societies: Case Studies of Nepal and Afghanistan**	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER **FA2386-12-1-4052**
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER **61102F**
6. AUTHOR(S) **Adrian Cherney**	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **University of Queensland,St Lucia,Brisbane,,Australia,AU,4072**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER **N/A**
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **AOARD, UNIT 45002, APO, AP, 96338-5002**	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) **AFRL/AFOSR/IOA(AOARD)**
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) **AOARD-124052**

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT **Approved for public release; distribution unlimited**

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
Legitimacy is central to citizens??? perception and acceptance of power and authority. As such, rebuilding institutional legitimacy is essential for stability in post-conflict societies. In this project we explore the factors that lead citizens to view their government as legitimate following the reconstruction of central government institutions after a conflict. We draw on a broad range of theories to investigate post-conflict legitimacy in Nepal.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Socio-Cultural Diversity, nation building, post-conflict reconstruction, conflict resolution

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**Same as Report (SAR)**	**181**	

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			*Form Approved*	
			OMB No. 0704-0188	

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 09-09-2015	2. REPORT TYPE Final	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)* 28 Mar 2012 – 27 Mar 2015

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Rebuilding Government Legitimacy in Post-conflict Societies: Case Studies of Nepal and Afghanistan	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER FA2386-12-1-4052
	5b. GRANT NUMBER Grant 12RSZ057 AOARD-124052
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 61102F
6. AUTHOR(S) Prof. Adrian Cherney	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) University of Queensland St Lucia Brisbane, Qld 4072 Australia	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AOARD UNIT 45002 APO AP 96338-5002	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) AFRL/AFOSR/IOA(AOARD)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) AOARD-124052

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
Legitimacy is central to citizens' perception and acceptance of power and authority. As such, rebuilding institutional legitimacy is essential for stability in post-conflict societies. In this project we explore the factors that lead citizens to view their government as legitimate following the reconstruction of central government institutions after a conflict. We draw on a broad range of theories to investigate post-conflict legitimacy in Nepal.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Socio-Cultural Diversity, nation building, post-conflict reconstruction, conflict resolution

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Ingrid J. Wysong, Ph.D.
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE	SAR	181	
U	U	U			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)* +81-3-5410-4409

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Final/Annual/Midterm Report for (Grant No FA2386-12-1-4052; AOARD 124052)

Funded and supported by the United States Air Force Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development (AOARD) and United States Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)

Research Report:

Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies - A case study of

Nepal

Period of Performance: 28-3-2012 to 27-3-2015

Authors:

Kylie Fisk
School of Social Sciences
The University of Queensland
St Lucia, Brisbane
k.fisk@uq.edu.au

Adrian Cherney
School of Social Sciences
The University of Queensland
St Lucia, Brisbane
uqachern@uq.edu.au

Cite as:

ABSTRACT

Legitimacy is central to citizens' perception and acceptance of power and authority. As such, rebuilding institutional legitimacy is essential for stability in post-conflict societies. In this project we explore the factors that lead citizens to view their government as legitimate following the reconstruction of central government institutions after a conflict. We draw on a broad range of theories to investigate post-conflict legitimacy in Nepal.

This research utilized Nepal as a case study. Nepal transitioned into a secular democratic republic in 2008, following ten years of civil war, and has subsequently been engaged in rebuilding central governance institutions. This project involved a pilot study (N=300, conducted in July and August 2012); two Waves of nationwide cross-sectional quantitative fieldwork (each N=1500 - Wave 1 conducted between August 2012 and October 2012, and Wave 2 conducted between September 2013 and November 2013); and a third wave of longitudinal panel data (N= 1500, 944-participants longitudinal panel from Wave 2 and 556 new cross-sectional participants - conducted between July 2014 and September 2014).[1]

Our data analysis focused on three main themes. The first is concerned with examining the relationship between perceived levels of post-conflict procedural justice and institutional trust and performance in Nepal. The basic relationships these variables display with central government legitimacy are examined. The second theme examines social identification and influence in Nepal, both at a superordinate

---

[1] This project also involved qualitative structured interviews (*N*=54 - 18 interviews per wave), which are not discussed in this report.

3

(national) level and subordinate (caste/ethnic) level. Relationships between identification, trust, influence, and legitimacy are explored. The third theme regards post-conflict democratic elections, including the effect of elections on perceived procedural fairness and legitimacy, and the legitimacy of democratic elections themselves. Additionally, the effect of transitional justice on institutional legitimacy is explored.

Results reveal relatively low levels of procedural justice, government performance, and government legitimacy in Nepal. Bivariate correlations suggest a strong relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy, and weaker relationships between instrumental variables and legitimacy. Levels of social identification were found to be extremely high in Nepal, though no difference is observed between levels of caste/ethnic identification and national identification. It is found that local influence is perceived to be greater than foreign group influence, though both display a positive association with legitimacy. However, voice—the perception that citizens have an input into processes that affect them—is found to be strongly associated with legitimacy. Two specific elements of procedural justice relevant to the post-conflict context—election legitimacy and transitional justice—are measured and their relationship with government legitimacy is observed. Election legitimacy was found to be relatively high in Nepal (unusually so for post-conflict elections), and was positively associated with government legitimacy. Transitional justice was perceived to be very low, with most citizens perceiving that human rights violations were committed during the war in Nepal, and most believing that the perpetrators had not yet been held accountable. Transitional justice was found to be positively associated with legitimacy, meaning that the less transitional justice that was perceived, the less

4

legitimate citizens perceived the central government to be.

This report comprises four sections. The first section provides a brief literature review of existing research on institutional legitimacy and the variables of interest in this study, including instrumental and procedural sources of legitimacy, 'local ownership' theories of legitimacy, and an introduction to election legitimacy and transitional justice. A brief outline of the conflict and reconstruction in Nepal is also provided in this section. The second section details the methodology of each Wave of fieldwork in Nepal. Selected results and discussion from each Wave of fieldwork are organized by theme and the phase of data collection. Implications and conclusions are presented in the fourth section. Project 'codebooks', encompassing descriptive information of all demographic and survey items, are attached in appendices.[2]

---

[2] Also see Fisk (2015) in which the relationships discussed in this report are examined in greater detail.

Table of Contents

1: INTRODUCTION

1.1: Project Overview

This project aimed to:

1) Evaluate the levels of perceived legitimacy of central and local institutions in post-conflict Nepal, and assess the relationships between instrumental and relational concerns and government legitimacy;

2) Examine the dynamics of social identities in Nepal, including identification, trust, influence, and legitimacy, within the context of 'local ownership' theories of legitimacy;

3) Investigate the effect of democratic elections and transitional justice on perceived fairness and legitimacy of post-conflict institutions.

Project methodology:

1) Pilot study (2012): 300 participants stratified random sampling in Nepal.

2) Wave 1 (2012): 1500 participants, random sampling in Nepal.

3) Wave 2 (2013): 1500 participants, random sampling in Nepal.

4) Wave 3 (2014): 1500 participants [944-participants longitudinal panel from Wave 2; 556 new cross-sectional participants].

5) Qualitative interviews: total n 54= [18 at Wave 1; 18 at Wave 2; 18 at Wave 3].

1.2: Relevant Theory And Literature

Legitimacy is central to people's perception and acceptance of power and authority, and is essential to the functioning and stability of institutional authorities (Alagappa, 1995; Beetham, 1991; Coicaud, 2007; Crick, 1993; Habermas, 1976; Weber, 1978). Political scientists refer to legitimacy as a 'reservoir of support' for governments (Dahl, 1956; Easton, 1965, 1975), and note the importance of creating and maintaining legitimacy as a foundation for the authoritativeness of the state (Lipset, 1959). Institutional legitimacy has been found to encourage decision acceptance, promote a sense of obligation to obey authorities, and is linked to behavioural outcomes such as compliance, cooperation, and engagement with authorities (Tyler & Jackson 2013). For these reasons, establishing legitimacy is identified as a priority in rebuilding post-conflict institutions (Brinkerhoff, 2005, Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Carment et al., 2010; Heathershaw & Lombach, 2008; McLoughlin, 2015; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Rotberg, 2004; USIP & PKSOI, 2009). However, the inability of conflict-affected states to gain sufficient institutional legitimacy has been described as "the most disappointing aspect of post-conflict reconstruction" (François & Sud, 2006, p.151). The present project aims to address this topic by empirically exploring the antecedents of government legitimacy in the post-conflict setting of Nepal.

According to Weber (1978), power must be accepted as legitimate by those subjected to it in order to be secured and maintained. He outlined three 'ideal types' of authority, each with their own source of legitimacy. These include *charismatic authority*, in which legitimacy is derived from the leadership of a charismatic or strong individual; *traditional authority*, in which legitimacy is derived from a

9

historical lineage of power, such as the Church or Kings; and *legal-rational authority*, based on rationally created rules and laws. In line with this formulation, Nepal's post-conflict statebuilding period—from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached in 2006 until the present—can be characterised as a shift from traditional authority to legal-rational authority, as the state transforms from a Hindu monarchy with power structures based on caste hierarchy, patriarchy and instrumental dominion into a secular democratic republic (see Askvik et al., 2011). In fact, this transition echoes Weber's predicted order of the modernising development of states from charismatic to traditional to legal-rational authority (considered to be the most advanced). The current intermediary phase of Nepal's transition from a long-standing traditional authority to a modern liberal political system makes it a particularly interesting case study of citizens' post-conflict legitimacy beliefs.

Procedural justice, government performance, and legitimacy

Theories of how legitimacy beliefs are formed in the post-conflict state can be broadly classified into two main perspectives: those focussed on citizen evaluations of outcomes, and those focussed on citizen evaluations of processes. Outcome-based theories of legitimacy conceive of support for democratic regimes as the consequence of citizen evaluations of the economic and political performance of those regimes (Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Gilley, 2009; Levi, 1998; McLoughlin, 2015; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Rothstein, 2005; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Van De Walle & Scott, 2009). Outcome-based theories hold that citizens hold perceptions of institutional legitimacy primarily due to instrumental outcomes, such as distributive justice or outcome favourability (Chanley et al., 2000; McAllister, 1999;

10

McLoughlin, 2015;). That is, instrumental theories hold that citizens base their assessments of the worthiness of an institution's output, whether that output is distributed fairly, and whether it advances personal welfare (e.g., Bok, 1997; Orren, 1997). In fragile and post-conflict societies, the ability of the government to provide basic services to citizens is often considered to be a key indicator of instrumental government performance (McLoughlin, 2012, 2015; Roberts, 2011).

By contrast, process-based theories of post-conflict institutional legitimacy hold that the procedures by which institutions operate are equally important for building legitimacy (e.g., Brinkerhoff 2007; Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Chesterman, 2007; Donais, 2009; Richmond, 2011). These approaches to building post-conflict legitimacy are premised on procedural mechanisms designed to foster a sense of inclusiveness in the new political system.

Procedural justice is a central element of the process-based approach to building legitimacy, holding that factors such as fair decision-making and respectful treatment provide internal motivations for citizens to legitimate and obey authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006). Although procedural justice was originally assumed to exert its positive effects by giving people a sense of control over outcomes that affected them (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), further research found that people continue to value procedural justice despite the favourability of the outcomes they receive (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003). These models have roots in Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which hold that people are motivated to derive value from the groups they belong to. Procedural justice, in the form of fair and respectful treatment by an authority, signifies the worthiness of an individual within a group,

leading citizens to identify with and confer legitimacy to the authority, which in turn enhances cooperation and deference (Jackson et al., 2015; Tyler 2006). Though not discounting the importance of outcomes, procedural justice has been shown to predict institutional legitimacy across a range of domains (Hough et al., 2013; Factor et al., 2013; Tyler, 2006). In the present study, procedural justice concerns are contrasted with instrumental outcomes in terms of their association with post-conflict government legitimacy in Nepal.

Social identification, local ownership, and legitimacy

Two elements of procedural justice—voice and neutrality— share overlap with the prominent statebuilding approach of 'local ownership'. Local ownership theories hold that institutional legitimacy is generated when local political authorities, with broad support among members of civil society, participate in policy discussions that affect them and hold influence over decision-making processes, as opposed to foreign actors and agencies (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Killick, 1998; Simonsen, 2005). Despite its centrality in statebuilding frameworks, the concept of 'local ownership' remains vague and understudied (Anderson, 2010). One underlying mechanism being investigated in the present project is the psychological concept of 'voice', i.e., judgments relating to perceived input into a decision making process, and how it may contribute to government legitimacy by fostering a sense of procedural justice. Indeed, in the social psychological literature, the most potent aspect of procedural fairness has been identified as the opportunity to participate in decision making processes (see, De Cremer & Alberts, 2004; De Cremer et al., 2008), with opportunities for voice resulting in the evaluation of procedures as more fair (Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos et al., 1998; Van Prooijen et al., Van den Bos, &

12

Wilke, 2002). This study aims to link the statebuilding ideal of local ownership with social psychology theories of voice and neutrality to demonstrate why local ownership may build institutional legitimacy in the long-term.

Post-conflict elections and transitional justice

Two further issues are relevant to legitimacy perceptions in a post-conflict society. First, elections are traditionally viewed within political science as the procedure through which democratic authorities are legitimated (Anderson et al., 2005), an argument reinforced by findings in behavioral economics (Frey et al.,2004) and social psychology (Gonzalez & Tyler, 2008). As such, elections are often at the forefront of statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts involving democratic transition (Kumar 1998). International development agencies invest heavily in building democratic institutions in states engaged in or emerging from conflict, often supporting expensive and even dangerous electoral processes (Bjornlund, 2004). In part, such efforts rest on the assumption that democratic elections enhance the domestic legitimacy of governments by increasing citizens' willingness to be governed. Berman et al (2014) conducted a field experimental in Afghanistan, finding that that respondents in areas that held fairer elections were more likely to consider their government legitimate, including the perception that Afghanistan was a democracy, the belief that the police should resolve disputes, and willingness to report insurgents to authorities. In Nepal, the second post-conflict national elections were held in late 2013. According to statebuilding theories, the perceived legitimacy of these elections should influence citizens' perceptions of the subsequently formed government (even if citizens' desired political party was removed from power). Thus,

this project aims to investigate the effect of election outcome and election legitimacy on perceived government legitimacy.

Next, transitional justice lies at the nexus of conflict and government legitimacy, with transitional justice theorists holding that until past grievances are addressed, the legitimacy of post-conflict governments will suffer (Kritz, 1995). Transitional justice invokes the concept of restorative justice (Bassiouni, 2002), in which citizens can reconcile past wrongs and move towards social harmony. Transitional justice has been posited as the mechanism through which 'emerging democracies reckon with former regimes' (Mandela, 1995), and as such, may be expected to display a relationship with post-conflict government legitimacy. Specifically, if post-conflict authorities are seen to have satisfactorily addressed past human rights violations, this could be seen to improve their trustworthiness in the eyes of citizens. Conversely, authorities that ignore or are indifferent to past grievances may be seen to be disinterested in citizens' trauma. Transitional justice is a timely issue in Nepal, as at the time of writing (March 2015), the establishment of a Truth and Reconcilliation Committee (TRC) has only recently been announced, the first in post-conflict Nepal. Thus, the final aim of this project is to uncover local perceptions of human rights abuses committed during conflict, how these grievances have been addressed, and the influence this may have on government legitimacy.

1.3: Nepal as a Case Study

The issue of government legitimacy is highly relevant in Nepal due to its varied and volatile social developments, caste hierarchies and identity politics (Whelpton, 2005). Nepal was established as a Hindu kingdom in 1798, and since that period has

14

experienced varying forms of ruling government. This includes a long line of Hindu Kings, as well as the Rana regime (1846-1951); a non-democratic *panchayat* system; and a parliamentary monarchy. Most recently, following a decade-long Maoist insurgency aimed at overthrowing the monarchy, Nepal has become a secular democratic republic. It has been led since 2008 by an interim government tasked with drafting the constitution for the 'New Nepal'. While there have been high expectations in the 'New Nepal', the process of democratisation has also seen the emergence of political instability as regional, ethnic, and caste groups jostle for power in the newly inclusionary system (see for example Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010; Jha 2014; Lawoti, 2013; Lawoti & Hangen, 2013; von Einsiedel et al., 2012). As mentioned previously, the transformation of Nepal can be conceived of as a shift from Weber's ideal type of traditional authority to the ideal type of legal-rational authority. Given that procedural justice can be considered a facet of legal-rational legitimacy (Tyler, 2006), the observation of process-based legitimacy perceptions in Nepal potentially captures the increasing importance of legal-rational concerns in the state-building process. The peacebuilding process in Nepal can so far best be described as a mixed bag – some commentators argue that it constitutes a liberal peace success story in the making (Denskus 2009), while accusations of a failure to address key causes of the conflict have come from observers within the media (e.g., Brown & Felbab-Brown, 2012), INGOs (e.g., ICTJ, 2012), and academia (e.g., Lundqvist, 2015).

1.4: Analytical Strategy

In summary, this project set out to answer the following research questions:

1) What are the current levels of perceived fairness and legitimacy of central government in post-conflict Nepal, and what is the relationship between relational and instrumental variables and legitimacy?

2) What are the dynamics of social identification, trust, and influence (voice) in Nepal, and how do these relate to government legitimacy?

3) How legitimate were the recent elections in Nepal, and what is the relationship between election legitimacy, transitional justice, and perceived government legitimacy?

The first research question is explored by analysing perceived levels of legitimacy in Nepal, and assessing relationships between legitimacy and both instrumental and process variables. That is, whether relational theories of procedural justice will generalise to the post-conflict context in Nepal, as citizens' legitimacy beliefs shift from a traditional to a legal-rational basis. The second research question is addressed by linking statebuilding concepts of local participation and ownership to legitimacy perceptions. Here, Nepalese citizens' perceived level of identification, voice and influence in political decision-making is assessed and linked to perceptions of legitimacy. The final research question focuses on specific post-conflict processes such as post-conflict elections and transitional justice, and how these variables relate to perceived governmental fairness and legitimacy.

The next section outlines the methodology employed at each stage of the project, including Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 3. Selected results from each Wave will then be presented and discussed in terms of the research questions outlined above.

16

2: METHODOLOGY

Data for this project were collected in three phases: a pilot survey, Wave 1 and Wave 2 data collection and Wave 3. This chapter details the procedures adopted in the pilot, and the Wave 1, 2 and 3 data collection periods, as well as drawing upon firsthand observations of the fieldwork in Nepal[3]. During all phases of the data collection the first author Kylie Fisk was present in Nepal and worked closely with local collaborators to prepare materials, train enumerators, and monitor the administration of the survey.

There are a number of unique challenges involved in conducting research in a post-conflict developing country (Desai & Potter, 2006; Scheyvens & Storey, 2003). Special considerations include the security of enumerators and research participants, sampling methods, and local cultural and linguistic barriers that influence how the research is perceived and understood by participants and gatekeepers (Renert et al., 2013). The research questions being addressed in this project require survey items of a relatively sensitive and contentious nature, both socially and politically, and thus require careful regard for appropriateness and fit (Renert et al., 2013). This is particularly necessary for a study of post-conflict Nepal, as social and political tensions were heightened during the fieldwork period for this research. This section outlines the ways in which these considerations were taken into account as the project developed, from survey development and sampling frame, to local collaborators and fieldwork challenges. Since the pilot study had important methodological implications for the subsequent main fieldwork periods, the first part

---

[3] Also see Fisk (2015) for more detail about the fieldwork.

of this section explains the procedures and implications of the pilot phase, before turning to the procedures for Wave 1, 2 and 3 of the main study.

In order to undertake the fieldwork, local collaborators in Nepal were selected following a vetting process with several institutions and agencies. Eventually, the firm Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) was selected due to its prior experience with conducting large-scale qualitative and quantitative fieldwork in Nepal for such agencies as the United Nations Development Program. IDA was contracted to assist with in-country ethical clearance, provide translation services and cultural advice, hire local supervisors and enumerators, facilitate training, and organise fieldwork logistics for the pilot and Wave 1, 2 and 3.

2.1: Pilot Survey

An initial in-country test of the variables and response scales to be used in the Wave 1, 2 and 3 survey was undertaken. Given that existing items on procedural justice and government legitimacy have largely been developed and validated in stable, Western, English-speaking societies (and mainly in the US; Tyler, 2006), the translation of these constructs to a post-conflict, developing society could not be assumed. Additionally, these survey items mainly rely on the use of Likert scale responses, and there is some evidence that there are cultural differences in responses to Likert scales (Flaskerud, 1988), particularly between US and Asian populations (Lee at al., 2002). Therefore, it was deemed necessary to investigate the most reliable and valid method of administering the Likert scale in Nepal. The effectiveness and practical feasibility of using a stratified random sampling method to ensure representativeness was also tested in the pilot, as well as monitoring methods to maintain control during the main fieldwork phases.

18

In summary, the pilot study was conducted in order to test:

- instructions to participants,

- translations and item wording,

- social and political sensitivity of survey items,

- reliability of scales,

- most appropriate response format,

- sampling methods,

- survey length and timing,

- methods of training large numbers of enumerators, and

- practical considerations involved in the administration of a large-scale survey in a post-conflict developing country (e.g., the impact of seasonal variation, festivals, strikes and protests).

Pilot Participants

Participants were Nepalese citizens (n= 340), consisting of 168 males and 172 females, with an age range of 18 to 80 years. Caste/ethnic composition of the sample was representative of broader Nepalese society, with 80 Hill Caste respondents, 80 Hill Ethnics, 29 Hill Dalits, 28 Newars, 37 Madhesi Caste, 36 Terai-Madhesi Ethnics, 20 Madhesi Dalits, and 30 Muslims (these eight main categories of caste/ethnic group were suggested and coded by our Nepalese collaborators - IDA).

Pilot Sampling

A stratified random sample with two strata variables – i.e. region and caste/ethnicity – was employed during the pilot. This was employed because existing information (Nepal National Population Census, 2011) indicates that region and caste/ethnicity

are the primary lines of social division in the country. Two ecological regions for the pilot sampling were randomly selected (the Hill region and the Terai) and within these regions, 3 districts were randomly sampled (Kapilvastu, Kaski, and Palpa). A total of 9 Village Development Committees (VDCs; similar to municipalities) were then randomly sampled within the districts (Purusottampur, Kapilbastu N.P, Jayanagar, Gajehada, Pokhara N.P, BharatPokhari, Pumdibhumdi, Tansen N.P., and Bhairabsthan). Caste/ethnic group sampling by region was based on Nepalese Census data, and at the village level, household selection was random if the village was ethnically homogenous, and purposive if the village was heterogeneous (i.e., to meet the caste/ethnic quota for that district). Within the household the participant was randomly selected.

Within each village, household selection was made using the Right-Hand rule (e.g. see European Union for Fundamental Rights 2009), in which the enumerator, on arriving in the village, takes the first right hand turn, then every second house on the right on that street is selected until the quota is met. Random selection within the household was achieved via the Kish Grid method (wherein the number of eligible participants is crosschecked with the household number to randomly select a participant). The Kish Grid is commonly used in large-scale social research, and is recognized as a valid method for equal-probability sampling when more than one case will be eligible for inclusion at a sampled address or household (Kish, 1949). Participants were counted as eligible for inclusion on the Kish Grid if they were at least 18 years old and citizens of Nepal.

Pilot Survey Materials

Two survey instruments were piloted to cover a broad range of constructs relating to the research questions. Given that pilot surveys were not used for the purpose of data analysis they are only briefly described in this section.

Sex, age, education, caste/ethnic group, marital status, regional heterogeneity, and main source of income were assessed. Survey 1 comprised items assessing voice, procedural justice, distributive justice, legitimacy, law legitimacy, and government performance; all adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003), and Murphy et al (2009) to fit the focus of the present study on government legitimacy. Perceptions of group influence measures were assessed, comprising a mixture of items for local and foreign groups, such as the eight main caste/ethnic groups in Nepal; government actors such as India, China, and the US; NGOs and INGOs, and the UN. Perceptions of trust and contact with these groups were also measured. Survey 2 variables included the same demographic information as survey 1. Voice, procedural justice, and legitimacy questions were repeated in survey 2. Additional items included caste/ethnic group and national group identification, relative power, status, legitimacy and stability of caste/ethnic groups, intergroup contact, trust and influence (using the same groups presented in survey 1).

Because the target population was largely unfamiliar with this type of survey structure, and at face-value the questions may have appeared to be quite abstract, a definition was added at the start of each section of the pilot questionnaire comprising the following statement: "*When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government*

21

operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government." The reason this explanation was provided was because this study aimed to examine legitimacy in the context of the institution of government - not the legitimacy of a particular political party. This is based upon the premise that the central institution of government and the way is operates and makes decisions is the object of legitimacy beliefs, regardless of the political party leading the government. This understanding is derived from the work of Easton (1965, 1975) and Weber (1978). [4] An introductory statement also explained the response format, i.e., agreement ratings of statements.

Response Scales

As mentioned previously, most of the measures used in this research have been developed and validated in democratically stable, Western, English-speaking countries, and rely on Likert scale responses. There is some evidence that Likert scales may not translate equally across cultures (Lee et al., 2008). The Likert scale itself depends on a participant holding a mental representation of a number line, which has been shown to be culturally bound and to not develop in the absence of formal education (Deheane et al., 2008). Due to generally low levels of education in Nepal (total adult literacy rate, 2005-2010: 59%; UNICEF, 2011) there was therefore some concern over the use of Likert scales for this research. Specifically, it was uncertain how to best ensure comprehension of the scale for a relatively large proportion of uneducated and illiterate participants, given that they would be unaccustomed to traditional methods of academic testing. It was unclear whether verbal or visual administration of the Likert scale would be preferable. As evidence

---

[4] For a more detailed explanation see Fisk (2015).

varies regarding the most reliable number of scale points in Western research populations (Dawes, 2008), the ideal number of scale points was considered for this research. Some cross-cultural researchers advocate pictorial presentation for illiterate populations (e.g., Bellwood-Howard, 2012), but on consultation with IDA – and based on their previous experience in the country – the best approach was deemed to be a modified version of the Likert scale, rather than an entirely new agreement scale. Hence four response scales were piloted for both surveys, allowing approximately 40 participants to respond to each response scale in each survey:

- A verbal 1-5 Likert scale (1 = Not at all; 2 = A little; 3 = Some; 4 = A lot; 5 = Entirely).
- A visual 1-5 scale (points as above, with the addition of a visual showcard - see appendix F)
- A verbal 0-10 scale ("If 1 means you don't agree at all, and 10 means you agree entirely, how much do you agree with this statement?")
- A visual 0-10 scale (as above, with an additional visual showcard - see appendix F)

Translation

In partnership with IDA, the surveys were composed in English, translated into Nepali, and then reassessed by the researchers and Nepali collaborators. The translation process involved removing typographical errors, clarifying core concepts, and isolating major discrepancies between the English and Nepali versions early in the process.

23

2.2 Pilot Procedure

Enumerators

There were a total of 12 enumerators, including 4 field supervisors, employed during the pilot fieldwork. Supervisors and enumerators were largely Nepali professionals and students in Kathmandu, though originating from the local region in which they would be conducting the fieldwork. Most enumerators (90%) had Bachelor degrees, some (approx. 20%) also had Masters degrees, and many had worked for IDA previously, or had several years of experience in conducting qualitative and quantitative fieldwork in Nepal. They were sent to regions where they would be, for the most part, interviewing participants matched for caste/ethnicity in the hope that congruence between enumerators and participants would facilitate trust and openness during the interviews. Bilingual enumerators fluent in Hindi and Nepali were hired and trained to administer the survey, as in some areas in the Southern belt of Nepal where the border with India is porous, only Hindi and local dialects are spoken and Nepali is not understood. Given enumerators involved in the pilot data collection would also act as supervisors and trainers during Wave 1, they were employed on the condition that they would be available during the Wave 1 main fieldwork period, and were trained in every element of the survey protocol and administration. Two days of training were held at IDA headquarters in Kathmandu prior to the start of fieldwork, covering topics such as informed consent, sampling design, response scales, and mock interviews. Supervisors and enumerators were encouraged to comment and ask questions throughout the two days of training, and there were debates about random sampling, survey methods, informed consent, and survey constructs.

24

Training sessions with the enumerators unintentionally served as a form of focus group for both the survey and the methods being used.

Pilot Fieldwork

Fieldwork took place between 31st July 2012 and the 14th August 2012. Full informed consent procedures were followed with each participant selected on the Kish Grid, who could then choose whether or not to continue with the survey. If they elected not to continue, enumerators would thank the members of the household and move to the next sampling point using the Right-Hand method.   If they chose to continue with the survey, participants were randomly assigned to complete either Survey 1 or Survey 2, and randomly assigned a response scale condition: 1-5 visual, 1-5 verbal, 0-10 visual, or 0-10 verbal. Enumerators carried paper copies of each survey, on which they coded the response scale, and recorded all survey answers. Enumerators worked in the field in teams of 4 (1 supervisor and 3 enumerators) with each of the 3 teams collecting data from approximately 100 participants.

A local fieldwork manager, a research officer/translator, and the first author monitored the fieldwork, meeting with supervisors and enumerators at field sites each day. Supervisors would report any problems that had occurred, including floods, nationwide strikes, harvesting and festivals, all of which made data collection difficult and required alterations to the fieldwork plan. However, given the widespread nature of these issues, subsequent analysis revealed that there were no systematic patterns in the participants who needed to be skipped for weather or social reasons. Supervisors also described participants' reaction to the survey: whether they were accepting or suspicious; understood the questions; or exhibited signs of fatigue.

25

The fieldwork lasted for a total of 14 days, after which the senior research staff, supervisors, and enumerators reconvened in Kathmandu and conducted a feedback workshop.

Enumerators reported that the informed consent procedure was clear and that they felt participants' understanding of anonymity, confidentiality, and the right to withdraw made them comfortable with being honest about sensitive questions, and that there was little hesitation about giving answers. Overall, enumerators reported that although some participants struggled with the surveys initially, after some time they became more comfortable and confident. Some participants had reported 'survey fatigue' from living in areas where a large number of NGOs and INGOs were based. The timing of the interviews was reported to vary- from as little as 20 minutes for a highly educated participant, to around an hour for an uneducated participant. Relatively lower item non-response rates were achieved compared to IDA's prior experience. We found that compared to similar themes explored in surveys previously, in which items were posed as questions rather than statements (e.g., "How much do you trust the government?" as opposed to "I trust the government"), our results had significantly fewer missing responses.

As indicated above, given the central importance of a consistent understanding of the term 'government' being used in the survey, participants were prompted with the following statement: "*When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of how the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.*" Feedback was solicited on participant reactions to this definition and in their interpretation of

26

the concept of government in subsequent discussions. Feedback from enumerators indicated that participants had understood the survey definition of 'government', and in further discussions had appeared to be aware that the government was an institution separate from its political leaders.

2.3: PILOT RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overall, the response rate for the pilot survey was approximately 90%. Analysis indicated that non-response was evenly distributed across units in the strata, suggesting no particular non-response bias. The results of the pilot determined that instructions to participants were clear and comprehensible, and aided understanding of the survey items. It was felt that the training schedule developed for enumerators was too rushed, and that an extra day (for a total of 3 days) should be allowed for the main fieldwork training. Although the survey covered sensitive items, no problems were reported with participants refusing to answer for social or political reasons.

The various response scales were assessed (verbal 1-5, visual 1-5, verbal 1-10, visual 1-10). The verbal 1-5 scale provided more even distributions and more reliable scales (i.e., Cronbach's alpha scores of .5 and above) across most of the constructs, and generally greater convergent validity. Additionally, response times were shortest when surveys were administered via the verbal scales due to reduced time spent explaining the visual show cards. Statistical results corresponded with observations from the field that participants and enumerators found the verbal 1-5 scale the easiest to understand and administer. We reasoned that the verbal 1-5 scale was more natural, as it mimicked the way citizens would discuss quantities in their everyday

27

interactions, and verbal presentation allowed them to place their response within a sentence, e.g., "I don't trust the government at all". Further, the closeness of the points on the 1-10 scale caused consternation amongst participants, and feedback was given that they did not understand the qualitative difference between agreeing at, for example, the 6th point of the scale as opposed to the 7th. That is, the 1-10 scale lacked validity for participants. Based on the results and observations outlined above, the verbal 1-5 scale was adopted for all items in Wave 1.

2.4: WAVE ONE FIELDWORK

Wave 1 Sampling

The target population for the Wave 1 and 2 surveys was the national population of adults aged 18 years and older in Nepal. Based on the pilot results showing some geographic variation in results, it was deemed important to achieve a level of geographic representativeness in the Wave 1 and 2 surveys. As a result, a stratified random sample was employed – similar to the pilot survey– whereby participants were randomly sampled within districts, VDCs, wards and households (see Figure 1 for example; for full sampling frame see Appendix C). The Wave 1 survey sample size was 1,500 respondents, which was estimated to permit reliable national estimates at a 95% confidence interval +/- 2.2% on an estimate of 50%. The response rate for the survey was high (95%) and methods for dealing with item non-response in the analyses is described below.

Figure 1. Sampling Method Wave 1.

First, the country was divided into 16 geographical districts (Figure 2). Within the districts, 77 Village Development Committees (VDCs) were randomly selected, followed by Wards within the VDCs. An example of District-VDC sampling is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Geographical Districts in Nepal

29

Figure 3. Example District-VDC Sampling for Eastern Nepal.

| District | All VDCs within district | Sampled VDCs |

Sampling within the village again used the Right-Hand rule, and the Kish Grid for random selection at the household level, as these methods were found to be effective in the pilot study.

Wave 1 Participants

A total of 1,500 participants were surveyed during Wave 1, consisting of 777 females and 723 males with an age range of 18-90 and a mean age of 39 years. Caste/ethnic composition was representative of Nepalese society, with 462 Hill Caste respondents, 376 Hill Ethnics, 107 Hill Dalits, 74 Newars, 256 Madhesi Caste, 98 Terai-Madhesi

Ethnic, 78 Madhesi Dalit, and 49 Muslims. Again, these eight categories of caste/ethnic group were suggested and coded by our Nepalese collaborators, though caste/ethnic group information was also collected at a more detailed level. Overall, 70 of Nepal's approximately 200 caste/ethnic groups were sampled during Wave 1. Literacy levels were also representative of the broader population, with 400 illiterate participants, 256 literate but uneducated, 216 with primary education, 183 lower secondary education, 129 upper secondary education, 156 with a school leaving certificate, 124 with an intermediate (diploma) certificate, and 36 with a Bachelor degree or above. Most participants were Hindu (n = 1181), with a small number of Buddhists (170), Muslims (53), Christians (23), Kirati (64 - a native animistic religion), and 2 atheists.

Wave 1 Measures

A single survey was administered during the Wave 1 fieldwork and items and scales are described below (for all items see Appendix D)

Demographic variables

Demographic information collected included age (for the purposes of analysis derived as a continuous variable in years), sex (dichotomous variable male = 1 female = 0; in Wave 1 48.2% of participants were male), caste/ethnicity (self-nominated by participants), education (dummy-coded 8 categories with primary education as the reference group), religion (dummy-coded 6 categories with Hindu as the reference), monthly income (continuous), marital status (dummy-coded 3 categories with married as the reference), settlement pattern (measured on a scale of 1-5, where 1 was a settlement pattern in which caste/ethnic group lived completely

31

separately and 5 a settlement pattern where caste/ethnic groups were completely intermingled) and voting intentions (dummy-coded 10 categories with Nepali Congress (NC) as the reference category).

Scales

All scales in the survey were derived by summing and averaging items. Resulting scores were grand mean centered and used as continuous variables in analyses. For all scale scores, higher scores reflected higher levels of the concept. Tests of reliability were performed for each scale using Cronbach's Alpha, which is presented along with mean and standard deviations of each score below.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy was measured as people's trust and confidence in the government, their respect for the government, and the perception that the government operates in the best interests of the people (drawing on the traditional conceptualisation of legitimacy, - Tyler, 2006,[5] e.g., 'The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese people'; see Appendix D). Four items reflected these concepts, and a higher score on this scale reflects higher levels of perceived government legitimacy (M=2.45, SD=.90, Cronbach's alpha=0.78).

Government Performance

The two-item government performance scale (e.g., 'The government has the ability to provide services to the citizens of Nepal'; see Appendix D) measured citizen's

---

[5] There has been a recent debate in the literature about the theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy when it comes to institutional authorities (see e.g., Jackson et al., 2015; Tyler & Jackson 2013 as it relates to moral obligation). In this project we draw on the traditional conceptualisation of legitimacy as proposed by Tyler and other scholars.

32

perceptions that the government could provide services to citizens and was able to govern effectively (M=2.85, SD=0.96, Cronbach's alpha=0.44).

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice was operationalised via Tyler and Huo's (2002) concepts of fairness, respect and neutrality (e.g. 'The government uses fair procedures when deciding how to handle situations'; Appendix D). The scale comprised four items and was highly reliable (M=2.12, SD=0.87, Cronbach's alpha=0.80).

Distributive Justice

Two distributive justice items assessed whether certain caste groups received more from the government than others, and whether the rich received better services than the poor (e.g. 'The government provides a better service to the rich than to the average citizen'; Appendix D; M=2.47, SD=0.82, Cronbach's alpha=0.40).

Outcome Favourability

The outcome favourability scale measured whether the government was perceived to deliver services and assistance to citizens, both individually and to their group (e.g. 'My ethnic/caste group receives a favourable share of government help'; Appendix D; M=1.95, SD=0.78, Cronbach's alpha=0.50).

2.5: Wave 1 Procedure

Enumerators and Training

33

Due to the much larger sample size for Wave 1 compared to the pilot, a total of 47 enumerators were employed, including 12 field supervisors. Supervisors for the Wave 1 fieldwork had all been involved in the pilot fieldwork, meaning they were familiar with the University research team and IDA staff and had an understanding of the survey items, response scales, and fieldwork procedures. They also assisted in training new enumerators, as well as acting as field supervisors. The pilot method of caste/ethnic matching was effective in facilitating trust in respondents, so as in the pilot, enumerators and participants were matched on caste and ethnicity as much as possible. Two training sessions were held – one in central-east Nepal (Kathmandu), and one in Far-West Nepal (Nepalgung). Both training sessions followed the same structure as the pilot, and lasted three days each. Training staff were the same for each session, including the first author of this report, a fieldwork manager, and a research officer who also acted as translator. The training schedule and topics covered were based on the outcomes of the pilot training. Training topics included an overview of the research aims, changes to the survey and protocol, informed consent procedures, effective interview techniques, and troubleshooting interviews.

Survey Administration

The fieldwork took place between the 21st September 2012 and the 1st November 2012. The procedure mirrored the pilot, wherein teams of 1 supervisor and 3 enumerators travelled to the capital of the district they were assigned, and gradually moved outwards to more remote fieldwork sites. Within villages, they followed the Right-Hand rule and selected participants using the Kish Grid method (as outlined in the pilot procedure). Participants were asked to nominate a location for the interview,

and as much as possible, enumerators were instructed to present in an informal yet engaged manner. At the end of each day, enumerators would report to supervisors and the paper surveys with recorded answers would be collected. Monitoring procedures followed the pilot, with a monitoring team of the fieldwork manager, a translator, and the first author, traveling to the main fieldwork sites and meeting with supervisors approximately every second day.

2.6: Wave Two Methods

One year following the first Wave of fieldwork, a second cross-sectional data collection took place. Procedures followed the same as those adopted in the pilot and Wave 1 fieldwork, therefore only variations from the methods described in the pilot and Wave 1 are described here.

Wave Two Sampling

As was the case in Wave 1, a stratified random sampling design was employed, with participants randomly sampled within the strata variable of region. This mirrored the procedures of the pilot and Wave 1. The country was divided into 16 geographical districts, and within the districts, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were randomly selected, followed by Wards within the VDCs. Sampling within the village again utilised the Right-Hand rule, and the Kish Grid for random selection at the household level, as in Wave 1.

Wave 2 participants

A total of 1,500 participants were surveyed during Wave 2 (F=773, M=727, age range 18-90, mean age 39). Caste/ethnic composition was representative of Nepalese society, with 547 Hill Caste respondents, 273 Hill Ethnics, 75 Hill Dalits, 70 Newars, 277 Madhesi Caste, 147 Terai-Madhesi Ethnic, 79 Madhesi Dalit, and 32 Muslims. Again, these eight categories of caste/ethnic group were suggested and coded by our Nepalese collaborators, though caste/ethnic group information was also collected at a more detailed level in the survey. Overall, 70 of Nepal's approximately 200 caste/ethnic groups were sampled during Wave 2. Literacy levels were also representative of the broader population, with 392 illiterate participants, 252 literate but uneducated, 171 with primary education, 189 lower secondary education, 152 upper secondary education, 150 with a school leaving certificate, 141 with an intermediate (diploma) certificate, and 53 with a Bachelor degree or above. Most participants were Hindu (1303), with a small number of Buddhists (75), Muslims (31), Christians (22), Kirati (66), and 3 atheists.

Wave 2 Measures

A single survey was administered during Wave 2 fieldwork. Scales repeated from the Wave 1 survey included procedural justice, distributive justice, outcome favourability, group power, voice, and group influences. New items and scales included participant-enumerator caste/ethnic congruency, gender congruency, perceptions of regional violence, trust in other institutions and performance of other institutions such as the courts and police, and government delivery of specific services. These measures are detailed below (see appendix E for all items in the Wave 2 survey).

Demographics

Demographic information collected included age, sex, caste/ethnicity, VDC, education, religion, profession, income, marital status, settlement pattern, and voting intentions.

Identification

A single visual item assessed participants' identification with their caste/ethnic group and the national Nepal group (see appendix E for the visual scale). On average, participants identified very strongly with both their subgroup (caste/ethnic group; M=4.25, SD=0.98) and superordinate group (national group; M=4.68, SD=.62). The perception of their group's level of power in Nepalese society was also measured (M=2.89, SD=1.20).

Voice

A three-item voice scale assessed citizens' perceptions that they could participate in government processes and were consulted by the government in making decisions (M=2.84, SD=0.77, Cronbach's alpha=0.51).

Group Influence

To assess the influence on the government of different groups in the Nepal, a list of 13 local and regional groups was compiled (see Appendix E). These comprised the eight main caste/ethnic categories in Nepal (local influences) and an assortment of regional, governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental actors (e.g., India, the US, the UN, INGOs). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each of the groups influenced how the government was run and operated. Factor analysis

37

revealed that participants' influence ratings of these groups fell into two factors along the expected local and foreign lines. Two scales were then developed comprising either local groups (M=2.67, SD=0.69, Cronbach's alpha=0.83) or foreign groups (M=2.86, SD=0.85, Cronbach's alpha=0.82).

Group Trust

Trust ratings were assessed for the same thirteen groups described above under the heading Group Influence, and two scales were created- local group trust (M=2.76, SD=.84, Cronbach's alpha=0.80) and foreign group trust (M=2.68, SD=.85, Cronbach's alpha=0.72).

Government delivery of services

The Wave 2 survey also allowed us to measure in more detail variables related to government performance and hence we included items related to assessments of the ability of government to deliver specific services. This allowed us to test a better and more differentiated operationalization of government performance relating to the delivery of basic infrastructure, food, housing, health, education, crime, the economy, and employment. One aim was to examine whether the effect of government performance remained stable across Wave 1 and Wave 2 depending on how it was measured (Wave 1: M = 2.85; SD= 0.96; Wave 2: M=2.59; SD=1.00).

2.7: Wave 2 Procedure

The procedure for Wave 2 followed the procedure of Wave 1 as closely as possible. For this reason, some details are omitted here to avoid repetition. An additional

component of the Wave 2 procedure was to allow for the collection of longitudinal data at Wave 3. These additional procedures will be detailed below.

Enumerators and Training

For Wave 2 a total of 47 enumerators were employed, including 12 field supervisors. Enumerators who had worked on Wave 1 were encouraged to return for Wave 2, and approximately 50% had worked on both surveys. Two training session were held again- one in central-east Nepal (Kathmandu), and one in Far-West Nepal (Nepalgung). Both training sessions followed the same structure, and took three days each. Training topics included an overview of the research aims, survey structure and protocol, informed consent procedures, effective interview techniques, and troubleshooting interviews.

An additional component of the Wave 2 survey included setting up procedures to allow the collection of longitudinal tracking of participants between Wave 2 and Wave 3. Ethical procedures did not permit enumerators to collect the names of participants, and as addresses are uncommon in Nepal, and email and mobile phone use is inconsistent (especially in rural areas), alternative strategies needed to be developed for finding participants at the second time point.

Therefore, during the final day of training, enumerators were instructed to described detailed location information, to be transcribed on the back of the completed survey of each participant (see example in Figure 4). First, a map key was developed so that all enumerators were using consistent symbols for houses, temples, trees, schools,

39

and other landmarks. Enumerators would sample participants according to the procedures described above. After surveying the participant, additional informed consent for being contacted the following year would be sought (the percentage of participants who agreed to be contacted again was very high—approximately 99%). If the participant agreed, enumerators would draw the location map on the back of the survey, indicating landmarks, households, and the participants sex, age and number of the Kish Grid. In this way, participants could be relocated without compromising anonymity.

Figure 4. Example of a map used to locate participants who agreed to longitudinal participation.

Survey Administration

The Wave 2 fieldwork took place between the 5th September 2013 and the 10th October 2013. Teams of 1 supervisor and 3 enumerators travelled to the capital of the district they were assigned, and gradually moved outwards to more remote fieldwork sites. Within villages, they followed the Right-Hand rule and selected participants using the Kish Grid method. Monitoring procedures followed the procedures adopted in the pilot and Wave 1, with a monitoring team meeting with supervisors approximately every second day and communication via mobile phone occurred daily.

2.8: Wave 3 Methods

The third Wave of fieldwork comprised a longitudinal design, in order to survey participants from Wave 2 at a second time point. Longitudinal methods are designed to measure stability and change over time, and assist in establishing causal relationships between variables.

Wave 3 Procedure

Enumerators and Training

For Wave 3 a total of 47 enumerators were employed, including 12 field supervisors. Enumerators who had worked on Wave 2 were encouraged to return for Wave 3, and approximately 70% had worked on both surveys. Two training session were held—one in central-east Nepal (Kathmandu), and one in Far-West Nepal

41

(Nepalgung). Both training sessions followed the same structure, and took three days each. Training topics mirrored those of the first Wave 1 and 2, with an additional component added to cover the longitudinal design, including the location maps described previously.

The Wave 3 fieldwork took place between the 25th July 2014 and the 1st September 2014. Teams of 1 supervisor and 3 enumerators travelled to the capital of the district they were assigned, and gradually moved outwards to more remote fieldwork sites. The Wave 2 sampling frame was used to relocate villages, and location maps were used to relocate houses and participants. If a participant from Wave 2 could not be located, enumerators would move to another side of the village or municipality, begin the sampling procedure from the Right-Hand Rule, and randomly sample a replacement participant. Monitoring procedures were the same as in the pilot, Wave 1 and 2, with a monitoring team meeting with supervisors approximately every second day and communication via mobile phone was held daily.

Wave 3 participants

A total of 1,500 participants were surveyed during Wave 3 (F=773, M=727, age range 18-90, mean age 39). 944 had previously participated in Wave 2, and 556 were new participants. Caste/ethnic composition was representative of Nepalese society, with 546 Hill Caste respondents, 281 Hill Ethnics, 74 Hill Dalits, 54 Newars, 275 Madhesi Caste, 181 Terai-Madhesi Ethnic, 62 Madhesi Dalit, and 27 Muslims. Literacy levels were also representative of the broader population, with 376 illiterate participants, 259 literate but uneducated, 169 with primary education, 179 lower

secondary education, 153 upper secondary education, 160 with a school leaving certificate, 144 with an intermediate (diploma) certificate, and 60 with a Bachelor degree or above. Most participants were Hindu (1296), with a small number of Buddhists (89), Muslims (29), Christians (21), Kirati (64), and 1 atheist.

Measures

A single survey was administered during the Wave 3 fieldwork. Scales repeated from the Wave 2 survey included procedural justice, distributive justice, outcome favourability, group power, voice, and group influences, participant-enumerator caste/ethnic congruency, gender congruency, perceptions of regional violence, trust in other institutions, performance of other institutions, government delivery of specific services. New items included measures of election legitimacy and perceptions of transitional justice. These measures are detailed below (see appendix F for all items in the Wave 3 survey).

Demographics

Demographic information collected included age, sex, caste/ethnicity, VDC, education, religion, profession, income, marital status, settlement pattern, and voting intentions.

Legitimacy

Four items measured government legitimacy, which assessed trust, respect, and confidence in the government (M=2.84, SD=.83, Cronbach's alpha=0.88).

43

Election legitimacy

Participants were asked to assess the legitimacy of the nationwide elections held in Nepal in November 2013 (in which the incumbent Maoist government lost power to the non-communist Nepali Congress party). Participants assessed whether the election was fair and free of corruption, and whether the results were accepted by the people and politicians of Nepal (M=2.71, SD=.63, Cronbach's alpha=.735).

Transitional justice

In this section, participants indicated whether they believed human rights abuses had been committed during the war (M=3.82, SD=1.01), and to what extent people who committed human rights abuses had been held accountable, and whether they were satisfied with transitional justice mechanisms put in place in Nepal (M=2.25, SD=.79 Cronbach's alpha=.682).

2.9: MISSING DATA

Participant refusal rates were negligible during Waves 1, 2 and 3 (i.e. an estimated refusal rate of approximately 1%). Although informed consent procedures clearly communicated that participation was voluntary, cultural norms within Nepal seemed to encourage participants' acquiescence in completing the survey. No participants subsequently reported dissatisfaction with their participation.

Gummer and Robmann (2013) describe a three-step strategy for dealing with item non-response. First, basic descriptive statistics are calculated to determine the extent of item nonresponse. Item nonresponse was approximately 10-20% for most

44

variables across all fieldwork phases. Next, Gummer and Robmann (2013) recommend evaluation of selected questions. It was found that there were relatively low (approximately 10%) nonresponse rates for items assessing the dependent variable (legitimacy) and key predictors (procedural justice, distributive justice, government performance, outcome favourability, voice). The highest item non-response was in the group trust and influence items (approximately 25%), which reflected genuine lack of knowledge of the groups themselves (e.g., citizens living on the southern Indian border often had never heard of China). As key variables displayed relatively minimal nonresponse rates, and the cause of high levels of nonresponse did not reflect meaningful bias, item nonresponse was not considered to be a problem in the three survey datasets. As a result of these tests, no adjustments were made in models to account for non-response.

3: SELECTED RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1: Wave One

The Wave 1 survey aimed to assess mean levels of legitimacy, procedural justice, government performance, outcome favourability, distributive justice, and law legitimacy, along with the basic relationships between these variables. Thus, this section is primarily concerned with citizens' perceptions of institutional performance and arrangements. Citizens' perceptions of post-conflict social relationships in Nepal are explored in Wave 2 and reported in the next section of this report.

Many other variables were assessed in Wave 1 (see Appendix D; Wave 1 codebook containing descriptive statistics for all items in the survey), however this section of the report highlights just some of the findings. Thus, the results presented here are intended as a snapshot of the data, and further in-depth analysis will be published in due course. Participant demographic information has been presented above, in the methods section of this report, and is also reported in the Appendix. Figure 5 presents mean levels of legitimacy, procedural justice, distributive justice, outcome favourability, and government performance as observed in the Wave 1 survey.

Figure 5. Mean level perceptions of instrumental and relational variables relating to government legitimacy in Nepal.

Legitimacy means were found to be below the numeric midpoint on the 1-5 scale (M = 2.25), indicating that overall, citizens have a low perception of government legitimacy in Nepal. Procedural justice scores are also below the midpoint ($M = 2.12$), indicating low perceptions of the government's ability to make decisions fairly and treat people with respect. Scores on the instrumental variables indicated similar mean perceptions of distributive justice ($M = 2.76$) and government performance ($M = 2.85$), with outcome favourability lower ($M = 1.94$). Next, bivariate relationships between each of the main variables were analysed (presented in Table 1 below).

47

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, Wave 1

	M(SD)	Outcome favourability	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Legitimacy
Government performance	2.85 (.96)	.26**	.07*	.35**	.42**
Outcome favourability	1.94 (.78)		.07*	.37**	.41**
Distributive Justice	2.76 (1.24)			.10**	.12**
Procedural Justice	2.12 (.86)				.50**
Legitimacy	2.45 (.89)				

Note.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
M= mean; SD = standard deviation

Government legitimacy was positively correlated with each of the main variables, particularly procedural justice ($r = .50$), government performance ($r = .42$), and outcome favourability ($r = .41$). Further, there were moderate correlations between some IVs, particularly procedural justice and outcome favourability ($r = .37$), as well as procedural justice and government performance ($r = .35$). These findings suggest that government legitimacy is most strongly related to procedural justice, as opposed to the instrumental variables also assessed in Wave 1. With regards to the first Wave of data collection, analysis revealed that procedural justice was more strongly associated with legitimacy than instrumental variables, although the instrumental variables were associated with legitimacy, albeit weakly.

3.2: Wave Two

Wave 2 in particular addresses the role of citizen voice and group trust and influence in building legitimacy. In this component of the legitimacy model, voice (i.e., citizens' perception that they have the ability to provide input into government decision-making) is expected to be positively associated with legitimacy. Further, this component measures perceptions of local (i.e., Nepali) and foreign group influence over the government, and their effect on legitimacy. Perceptions of local group trust and influence are composite measures combining ratings of influence of several Nepalese groups (e.g., Hill Caste, Terai Madhesi Janajati, Muslims). Perceptions of foreign trust and influence are composite measures comprising influence ratings of relevant foreign groups (e.g., India, the UN, the US, INGOs, China). The scales used for analysis in this section are presented in Chapter Two above, and individual item statistics are presented in Appendix E (codebook Wave 2).

Many other variables were assessed in Wave 2 (see Appendix E; Wave 2 codebook containing descriptive statistics for all items in the survey), however this section of the report highlights just some of the findings. Participant demographic information has been presented above, in the methods section of this report, and is also reported in the Appendix.

Figure 6 presents means for Wave 2 variables including voice, local trust, foreign trust, local influence, foreign influence, caste/ethnic identification, national

49

identification, and legitimacy.

Figure 6. Mean perceptions of Wave 2 variables including identification, voice, local trust and influence, foreign trust and influence, and legitimacy.

Overall, levels of both caste/ethnic and national identification were extremely high, towards the upper limits of the 1-5 scale (M=4.28 and M=4.68 respectively). The difference between these variables did not reach statistical significance, t (1496)=.009, p=.993, indicating that Nepalese did not substantially differ in identification between their caste group and the national group.

50

Next, Nepalese citizens trusted local groups (M=2.76) more than foreign groups (M=2.68), and this difference was statistically significant, t (1496)=-2.05, $p < .05$. That Nepalese would trust local groups more than foreigners is an unsurprising result, given that other Nepalese groups represent the in-group and citizens are more likely to implicitly trust members of these groups.

Likewise, local groups were perceived to have more influence over how the government is run and operated than foreign groups (M=2.89 and M=2.40 respectively), and this difference was statistically significant, t (1128)=-22.92, $p < .001$. In terms of theories of local ownership discussed in section one, this is a positive result, as often in a post-conflict environment citizens perceive that foreign groups wield more influence over the government than locals in a transitional context. Next, bivariate correlations were calculated for each of the variables of interest in this section (see Table 2).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for Wave 2 variables

	M (SD)	Caste/ethnic ID	National Nepali ID	Voice	Nepal group trust	Foreign group trust	Nepal group influence	Foreign group influence	Legitimacy
Caste/ethnic ID	4.28 (.71)		.16**	.04	.16**	.11**	.22**	.15**	.04
National Nepali ID	4.68 (.76)			.06	.12**	.20**	.14**	.22**	-.01
Voice	2.84 (.75)				.17***	.13**	.17**	.17**	.21**
Nepal group trust	2.76 (.84)					.38**	.42**	.15**	.17**
Foreign group trust	2.68 (.85)						.11**	.38**	.12**
Nepal group influence	2.86 (.69)							.39**	.19**
Foreign group influence	2.42 (.74)								.10**
Legitimacy	2.46 (.90)								

Note.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
M= mean; SD = standard deviation

Citizens' perception of voice (i.e., their personal ability to provide input into decision-making, M=2.84) was below the scale midpoint and lower than their ratings of group influences. Trust ratings were significantly correlated, in that people who trusted local groups also tended to trust foreign groups (r=.15). Additionally, people who perceived high influence of local groups also perceived higher influence of foreign groups (r=.39). Perceived voice was also positively associated with the perceived influence of local groups (r=.17) and foreign groups (r=.17).

Most importantly, legitimacy was significantly correlated with each of the variables intended to represent 'local ownership' in the Nepal context. These correlations ranged from .10 to .21, with perceived voice displaying the strongest relationship with government legitimacy.

In summary, Nepalese citizens trusted local groups more than foreign groups, and overall, local and foreign group trust were associated with increased legitimacy. In terms of group influence, local group influence was positively associated with legitimacy, along with foreign group influence. Positive effects of voice and local trust and influence suggest that some degree of local participation and influence provides benefits in terms of legitimacy perceptions. However, the negative consequences of foreign group influence on institutional legitimacy, as predicted by the local ownership literature, were not observed in this project.

3.3: Wave Three

Wave 3 was conducted following a nationwide election in Nepal. This, the final

53

section of results examines mean election legitimacy, and the relationship between election legitimacy, satisfaction with election outcomes, and government legitimacy. Second, the issue of human rights abuses committed during the civil war are salient in Nepal, as at the time of writing the country prepares to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. The scales used for analysis in this section are presented in Chapter Two above, and individual item statistics are presented in Appendix F (codebook Wave 3).

Many other variables were assessed in Wave 3 (see Appendix F; Wave 3 codebook containing descriptive statistics for all items in the survey), however this section of the report highlights just some of the findings. More in-depth analysis including longitudinal analysis will be published in due course. Participant demographic information has been presented above, in the methods section of this report, and is also reported in the Appendix E codebook.

Figure 7 presents means for Wave 3 variables including legitimacy, procedural justice, satisfaction with election outcome, election legitimacy, the perception that human rights violations were committed during the war, and the perception that human rights violations have been appropriately dealt with in post-conflict Nepal.

Figure 7. Wave 3 levels of perceived legitimacy, election legitimacy, and transitional justice in Nepal

Results indicate that despite a small increase in legitimacy from the previous year's survey (M=2.83), government legitimacy in Nepal still remains relatively low. More positively, however, most citizens were satisfied with the outcome of the elections (73% a lot or entirely), and the elections were widely perceived as legitimate by the population (nearly 58% strongly or entirely agreed with the statement 'The elections were fair and free of corruption').

The majority of citizens perceived that human rights abuses had been committed during the war (nearly 60% strongly or entirely agreed that they had), and most were also dissatisfied with transitional justice mechanisms put it place in Nepal thus far (51% felt that perpetrators had not been held accountable, and 46% were unsatisfied with procedures put in place to deal with human rights abuse committed during the war).

Next, zero-order correlations between the variables were performed in order to

55

examine simple relationship between the main variables (presented in Table 3).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, wave 3

M(SD)		Legitimacy	Desired election outcome	Election legitimacy	Perceived HR abuse	Perceived transitional justice
Procedural justice	2.33 (.81)	.49**	.15**	.14**	.02	.18**
Legitimacy	2.83 (.83)		.28**	.30**	.11**	.17**
Desired election outcome	3.83 (1.17)			.64*	.10**	.12**
Election legitimacy	2.71 (.63)				.15**	.14**
Perceived HR abuses	3.82 (.1.10)					-.13**
Perceived transitional justice	2.51 (.79)					

Note.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
M= mean; SD = standard deviation

From these results there appears to be relationship between government legitimacy and election outcome (r=.28), but a marginally stronger relationship between government legitimacy and election legitimacy (r=.30). However, a strong correlation can be observed between election outcome satisfaction and election legitimacy (r=.64), implying that citizens' whose preferred political party gained power are more likely to perceive the election as legitimate.

Next, transitional justice and government legitimacy are positively correlated (r=.17), as well as transitional justice and procedural justice (r=.18), providing initial evidence that the way a post-conflict government handles human rights abuses committed during the war may have some bearing on current legitimacy perceptions. A negative relationship between perceived human rights abuse and perceived transitional justice was also observed (r=-.13), indicating that the stronger a citizens'

56

belief that human rights abuses were committed, the less satisfied they are with transitional justice mechanisms in Nepal.

4: IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This project aimed to investigate how perceptions of institutional legitimacy can be cultivated in a post-conflict environment. At the outset of this report, three research questions were posed:

1) What are the current levels of perceived fairness and legitimacy of central government in post-conflict Nepal, and what is the relationship between relational and instrumental variables and legitimacy?

2) What are the dynamics of social identification, trust, and influence (voice) in Nepal, and how do these relate to government legitimacy?

3) How legitimate were the recent elections in Nepal, and what is the relationship between election legitimacy, transitional justice, and perceived government legitimacy?

Selected findings from each Wave of fieldwork have been presented in this report, allowing some initial observations regarding these research questions.

First, it was found that procedural justice was more strongly associated with local perceptions of post-conflict government legitimacy than instrumental outcomes including government performance, distributive justice, and outcome favourability. These results are in line with previous findings by Rothstein (2009; also Epstein et al 2013) who found that in post-conflict societies, institutional legitimacy was generated via perceptions of procedural fairness in the implementation of public policies. Further, these results add to the body of research illustrating that people are particularly attuned to relational cues when making assessments of authorities in

58

post-conflict contexts (McLoughlin 2015). This finding shows that even in the earliest emergence of new political institutions, citizens primarily evaluate the legitimacy of these institutions based on the fairness of the government's decision-making and the quality of the relationship between citizens and state (i.e., the perception of being treated with dignity and respect). That is, in a post-conflict environment, immediately following democratic transition, citizens may look to authorities for relational information to determine their judgements of the legitimacy of the new institutions. The present project also extends previous work on procedural justice in transitional contexts by comparing instrumental and procedural sources of legitimacy, and shows that procedural sources of legitimacy are associated with legitimacy more so than instrumental outcomes.[6]

Second, insofar as 'local ownership' may be conceived as citizen voice and local influence over post-conflict government processes, this result finds evidence for a positive effect of local ownership on post-conflict government legitimacy. The theory section of this report explored literature debating the importance and contingencies of local ownership in post-conflict reconstruction. This literature holds that engaging local citizens and minimizing foreign influence over post-conflict processes builds sustainable institutional legitimacy in the long-term. This project has attempted to investigate the concept quantitatively by measuring the relative trust towards and influence of a) local Nepalese caste/ethnic groups, and b) foreign groups, including regional governmental, non-governmental, and inter-governmental organisations. All groups were relevant to the Nepalese context, in an attempt to ground this component in local experience.

---

[6] See also Fisk 2015 for a more detailed analysis of this relationship and also Fisk and Cherney 2015.

Results indicated that voice (i.e. the perception that citizens could influence the decision-making processes of the government) was most strongly related to government legitimacy. This speaks to ongoing debates about the nature and implementation of local ownership in post-conflict reconstruction. Knoll (2007), for example, conceives the debate as a conflict between the degree of local participation and the quality of local participation. Certainly in the present study, citizens were not asked to assess the quality of the influence. This means that a particular group could have a high influence over government processes, but that some citizens would perceive this influence as positive and others as negative.

Third, both satisfaction with election outcomes and election legitimacy were associated with post-conflict government legitimacy. However, election satisfaction and election legitimacy were also strongly correlated, implying that election outcomes are linked to the perceived legitimacy of elections. Further work involving more sophisticated statistical analysis is planned for these data. Wave 3 also included measures of perceived transitional justice and government legitimacy, with a positive relationship observed as expected. It is also worth noting that descriptive statistics showed extremely low levels of perceived transitional justice in Nepal, indicating that although the country has a long way to go in addressing human rights violations committed during the war, mechanisms such as the recently-formed Truth and Reconciliation Commission will assist in improving institutional legitimacy at the central government level.

This research suggests that post-conflict legitimacy is best built through procedural

justice, in line with previous research conducted in stable Western democracies. Further, specific post-conflict measures related to procedural justice—such as democratic elections and transitional justice mechanisms—may also improve institutional legitimacy, as suggested by the statebuilding literature. These results were observed in the cultural context of extremely strong subgroup identities (i.e., the caste system in Nepal) and help demonstrate the robustness of this finding. Evidence was found that social identities are extremely strong in Nepal, and that relationships between identification, voice, influence and legitimacy can be observed, suggesting that this is a fruitful avenue of investigation for further research.

This research also highlights the advantages of studying 'local legitimacy', i.e., legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This descriptive, or subjective, approach to legitimacy is common in psychological and criminological research, but less common in the fields of political science and statebuilding. This approach allows for insight into the internal motivations of citizens in post-conflict societies, and highlights the importance of political authorities building citizens' understanding of shared public values at the outset of democratic transitions.

These results also address concerns by scholars and practitioners who reject the transfer of the Western model of democratic institutions to non-Western post-conflict societies. There is scepticism that a relatively standardised model of post-conflict democratic transition can be successfully grafted onto non-Western developing societies (e.g. Call and Cook, 2003). However, citizens in this project largely assessed the legitimacy of the government through procedural elements (procedural

61

justice, voice, local participation) that align with the principles of liberal democracy practiced in the West.

Further analysis - including detailed multilevel analysis of the longitudinal data collected in Wave 3 - is still needed. However, this report provides evidence that rigorous quantitative fieldwork is possible in a developing, post-conflict society, and that interdisciplinary work in this environment can provide policy-relevant insights into local perceptions of institutional legitimacy.

REFERENCES

Alagappa, M. (Ed.). (1995). *Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority*. Stanford University Press.

Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005). *Losers' Consent: Elections and democratic legitimacy*. OUP Oxford.

Anderson, K. (2010). Accountability as legitimacy global governance, global civil society and the United Nations. *Brook. J. Int'l L.*, *36*, 841.

Askvik, S., Jamil, I., & Dhakal, T. N. (2011). Citizens' trust in public and political institutions in Nepal. *International political science review*, 0192512110377437.

Bassiouni, M. C. (Ed.). (2002). *Post-conflict justice*. Transnational Publishers.

Beetham, D. (1991). *The legitimation of power*. Macmillan.

Bellwood-Howard, I. (2012). Research and dissemination methods for non-literate contexts. Ghana Institute of Linguistics, Literacy and Bible Translation Conference Centre. Tamale: Ghana.

Berman, E., M. Callen, C. Gibson and J. Long (2014), Election fairness and government legitimacy in Afghanistan, NBER Working Papers, 19949. (Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19949).

Bok, D. (1997). The state of the nation: Government and a quest for a better society. Harvard University Press.

Bjornlund, E. (2004). *Beyond free and fair: Monitoring elections and building democracy*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2005). Rebuilding governance in failed states and post‑conflict societies: core concepts and cross‑cutting themes. *Public Administration and Development*, *25*(1), 3-14.

Brinkerhoff, D. (2007). Capacity development in fragile states. *International Public Management with Research Triangle Institute (RTI International), Mimeo*.

Brinkerhoff, D. W., Wetterberg, A., & Dunn, S. (2012). Service delivery and legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected states: Evidence from water services in Iraq. *Public Management Review*, *14*(2), 273-293.

Brockner, J., Heuer, L., Siegel, P. A., Wiesenfeld, B., Martin, C., Grover, S., ... & Bjorgvinsson, S. (1998). The moderating effect of self-esteem in reaction to voice: converging evidence from five studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(2), 394.

Brown, S., & Felbab-Brown, V. (2012) Nepal on the brink of collapse. *New York Times*, June 5, 2012, (Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/opinion/nepal-on-the-brink-of-collapse.html?_r=0).

Call, C. T., & Cook, S. E. (2003). On democratization and peacebuilding. *Global Governance*, *9*, 233-246.

Carment, D., Prest, S. and Samy, Y. (2010) Security, development and the fragile State: Bridging the gap between theory and policy, London: Routledge.

Chanley, V. A., Rudolph, T. J., & Rahn, W. M. (2000). The origins and consequences of public trust in government: A time series analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *64*(3), 239-256.

Chesterman, S. (2007). Ownership in theory and in practice: Transfer of authority in UN statebuilding operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *1*(1), 3-26.

Cook, K. S., Hardin, R., & Levi, M. (2005). *Cooperation without trust?*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Coicaud, J. M. (2007). *Beyond the national interest: The future of UN peacekeeping and multilateralism in an era of US primacy*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Crick, B. (1993 [1962]). In defense of politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1957). Decision-making in a democracy: The Supreme Court as a national policy-maker. *J. Pub. L.*, *6*, 279.

Dawes, J. (2008). Do data characteristics change according to the number of scale points used. *International Journal of Market Research*, *50*(1), 61-77.

Dehaene, S., Izard, V., Spelke, E., & Pica, P. (2008). Log or linear? Distinct intuitions of the number scale in Western and Amazonian indigene cultures. *Science*, *320*(5880), 1217-1220.

De Cremer, D., & Alberts, H. J. (2004). When procedural fairness does not influence how positive I feel: The effects of voice and leader selection as a function of belongingness need. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *34*(3), 333-344.

De Cremer, D., Cornelis, I., & Van Hiel, A. (2008). To whom does voice in groups matter? Effects of voice on affect and procedural fairness judgments as a function of social dominance orientation. *The Journal of social psychology*, *148*(1), 61-76.

Dehaene, S., Izard, V., Spelke, E., & Pica, P. (2008). Log or linear? Distinct intuitions of the number scale in Western and Amazonian indigene cultures. *science*, *320*(5880), 1217-1220.

Denskus, T. (2009). The fragility of peacebuilding in Nepal. *Peace Review*, *21*(1), 54-60.

Desai, V., & Potter, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Doing development research*. Sage.

Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post‑conflict peacebuilding processes. *Peace & Change*, *34*(1), 3-26.

Easton, D. (1965). *A framework for political analysis* (Vol. 25). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British journal of political science*, *5*(04), 435-457.

Epstein, L.M., Goff, P.A., Huo, Y.J., Wong, L.H. (2013). A taste for justice: Unpacking identity politics in a nascent democracy. *Political Psychology, 34* (5), 779-789.

European Union for Fundamental Rights. (2009). *European Union Minorities and Discrimination Surveys. Technical Report. Methodology, Sampling and Fieldwork*. European Union for Fundamental Rights (http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-midis_technical_report.pdf).

Factor, R., Mahalel, D., Rafaeli, A., & Williams, D. R. (2013). A social resistance perspective for delinquent behaviour among non-dominant minority groups. *British Journal of Criminology*. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azt035.

Fisk, K. (2015) *Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: A case study of Nepal*. PhD Thesis, the University of Queensland.

Fisk, K & Cherney, A. (2015) *Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: Instrumental and relational sources of legitimacy*. Paper out for review.

64

Flaskerud, J. H. (1988). Is the likert scale format culturally biased?. *Nursing Research*, *37*(3), 185-186.

François, M., & Sud, I. (2006). Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states. *Development policy review*, *24*(2), 141-160.

Frey, B. S., Benz, M., & Stutzer, A. (2004). Introducing procedural utility: Not only what, but also how matters. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 377-401.

Gilley, B. (2009). Is democracy possible?. *Journal of Democracy*, *20*(1), 113-127.

Gonzalez, C. M., & Tyler, T. R. (2008). The psychology of enfranchisement: Engaging and fostering inclusion of members through voting and decision making procedures. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*(3), 447-466.

Gummer, T., & Robmann, J. (2013). Good questions, bad questions? A post-survey evaluation strategy based on item nonresponse. *Survey Methods: Insights from the Field (SMIF)* (accessed at http://surveyinsights.org/?p=2330)

Habermas, J. (1976). *ZUR Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus* (Vol. 154). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Hachhethu, K., & Gellner, D.N. (2010). Nepal: Trajectories of democracy and restructuring of the state' in P. Brass (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics*, 131-46. London & New York: Routledge.

Heathershaw, J. & Lambach, D. (2008). Introduction: post-conflict spaces and approaches to statebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *2*(3). 269-289.

Hough, M., Jackson, J., & Bradford, B. (2013). *Legitimacy, trust and compliance: an empirical test of procedural justice theory using the European Social Survey*. Oxford University Press.

ICTJ (International Centre for Transitional Justice) (2012). Relief, reparations, and the root causes of conflict in Nepal. (Available at https://www.ictj.org/publication/relief-reparations-and-root-causes-conflict-nepal

Jackson, J., Hough, M., Bradford, B., & Kuha, J. (2015). Empirical legitimacy as two connected psychological states. In G. Mesko & J. Tankebe (eds) *Trust and Legitimacy in Criminal Justice: European Perspectives*. Springer International Publishing, Switzerland (pp. 137-160).

Jha, P. (2014). *Battles of the new republic: A contemporary history of Nepal*. Oxford University Press.

Knoll, B. (2007). Bosnia: Reclaiming local power from international authority. *European Constitutional Law Review*, *3*(03), 357-366.

Killick, T. (1998). *Aid and the political economy of policy change*. Psychology Press.

Kish, L. (1949). A procedure for objective respondent selection within the household. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, *44*(247), 380-387.

Kritz, N. J. (1995). The dilemmas of transitional justice. *Transitional justice: how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes*, *1*. United States Institute of Peace.

Kumar, K. (1998). Postconflict elections and international assistance. *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*, 6.

Lawoti, M. (2013). 9 Dynamics of mobilization. In M. Lawoti & S. Hangen (eds) *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Nepal: Identities and mobilization after 1990*, *58*, 193. Routledge.

Lawoti, M., & Hangen, S. (Eds.). (2013). *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Nepal: identities and mobilization after 1990* (Vol. 58). Routledge.

Levi, M. (1998). A state of trust. In V Braithwaite & M Levi (eds) *Trust and governance*, Russell Sage Foundation, NY, (pp 77-101).

Lee, J. W., Jones, P. S., Mineyama, Y., & Zhang, X. E. (2002). Cultural differences in responses to a Likert scale. *Research in nursing & health*, *25*(4), 295-306.

Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). *The social psychology of procedural justice.* Springer.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American political science review*, *53*(01), 69-105.

Lundqvist, M. (2015). Everyday conceptualizations of sustainable peace in Nepal: post-liberal peace and beyond?. ASIA IN FOCUS: A Nordic journal on Asia by early career researchers, (1), 45-52.

Mandela, N. (1995). *Transitional justice: how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes* (Vol. 2). N. J. Kritz (Ed.). US Institute of Peace Press.

McAllister, I. (1999). The economic performance of governments. In P. Norris (ed.),

Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McLoughlin, C. (2015). When does service delivery improve the legitimacy of a fragile or conflict-affected state?. *Governance*, 28, 341–356.

McLoughlin, C. with Batley, R. (2012)'The effects of sector characteristics on accountability relationships in service delivery'. *London: Overseas Development Institute*.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. *Comparative political studies*, *34*(1), 30-62.

Murphy, K., Tyler, T. R., & Curtis, A. (2009). Nurturing regulatory compliance: Is procedural justice effective when people question the legitimacy of the law?. *Regulation & governance*, *3*(1), 1-26.

Nepal National Population Census. (2011). *National population and housing census 2011*(National Report). Government of Nepal: Kathmandu.

Orren, G. (1997). Fall from grace: The public's loss of faith in government. *Why people don't trust government*, 77-107.

Paris, R., & Sisk, T. D. (Eds.). (2009). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. Routledge.

Renert, H., Russell-Mayhew, S., & Arthur, N. (2013). Recruiting ethnically diverse participants into qualitative health research: Lessons learned. *Qualitative Report*, *18*(12).

Richmond, O. P. (2011). Critical agency, resistance and a post-colonial civil society. *Cooperation and conflict*, *46*(4), 419-440.

Roberts, D. (2011). Post-conflict peacebuilding, liberal irrelevance and the locus of legitimacy. *International Peacekeeping*, *18*(4), 410-424.

Rotberg, R. I. (2004). Strengthening governance: Ranking countries would help. *Washington Quarterly*, *28*(1), 71-81.

Rothstein, B. (Ed.). (2005). *Social traps and the problem of trust*. Cambridge University Press.

Rothstein, B. (2009). Creating political legitimacy electoral democracy versus quality of government. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *53*(3), 311-330.

Sarsfield, R., & Echegaray, F. (2006). Opening the black box: How satisfaction with democracy and its perceived efficacy affect regime preference in Latin America. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *18*(2), 153-173.

Scheyvens, R., Storey, D. (Eds). (2003). *Development fieldwork: A practical guide*. London, UK: Sage.

Simonsen, S. G. (2005). Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building: Lessons from recent cases. *Security Dialogue*, *36*(3), 297-318.

Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing. *Law & Society Review*, *37*(3), 513-548.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *The social psychology of intergroup relations*, *33*(47), 74.

Thibaut, J. W., & Walker, L. (1975). *Procedural justice: A psychological analysis* (pp. 1141-1160). Hillsdale, NJ; New York, NY: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Tyler, T. R. (2006). Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.*, *57*, 375-400.

Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in proups: Procedural justice. *Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement, Philadelphia, PA*.

Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2003). The group engagement model: Procedural justice, social identity, and cooperative behavior. *Personality and social psychology review*, *7*(4), 349-361.

Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. (2002). *Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the police and courts*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Tyler, T., & Jackson, J. (2013). Future challenges in the study of legitimacy and criminal justice. *Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper*, (264).

Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). *A relational model of authority in groups*. Academic Press.

UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund). (2011). *UNICEF Annual Report 2010*. UNICEF.

USIP and PKSOI (US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute). (2009). *Guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction*, Washington, DC: USIP Press.

Van de Walle, S. G. J., & Scott, Z. (2009). The role of public services in state-and nation building: Exploring lessons from European history for fragile states. *GSDRC Research Paper July 2009,* International Development Department: University of Birmingham.

Van den Bos, K., Wilke, H. A., & Lind, E. A. (1998). When do we need procedural fairness? The role of trust in authority. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(6), 1449.

Van Prooijen, J. W., Van den Bos, K., & Wilke, H. A. (2002). Procedural justice and status: status salience as antecedent of procedural fairness effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(6), 1353.

von Einsiedel, S., Malone, D. M., & Pradhan, S. (Eds.). (2012). *Nepal in transition: from people's war to fragile peace*. Cambridge University Press.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. Univ of California Press.

Weber, M. (1966). The development of caste. *Class, Status, and Power. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul*.

Whelpton, J. (2005). *A history of Nepal*. Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX A: VISUAL SHOWCARDS (ENGLISH VERSIONS)

1------2------3------4------5

Not at all-------A little-------Somewhat-------A lot-------Entirely

1---2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

Not at all---Entirely

70

APPENDIX B: ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT REGION TO DISTRICT SAMPLING

(WAVE I)

Eco-Dev Region	District	Sample District (1st-Stage)	Population Size (Eco-Dev)	Population Size (District)	Sample Size (Eco-Dev)	Sample Size (District)
Eastern Mountain	Taplejung Sankhuwasabha Solukhumbu	Sankhuwasabha	392,089	No need	38	38
Eastern Hill	Panchthar Ilam Dhankuta Terhathum Bhojpur Okhaldhunga Khotang Udayapur	Panchthar	1,601,347	No need	76	76
Eastern Tarai	Jhapa Morang Sunsari Saptari Siraha	Morang Siraha Saptari	3,818,119	965,370 637,328 639,284	216	94 60 62
Central Mountain	Dolakha Sindhupalchok Rasuwa	Dolka	517,655	No need	46	46
Central Hill	Kavrepalanchok	Kavrepalanchok	1,914,790	No need	100	100

	Nuwakot					
	Sindhuli					
	Ramechhap					
	Dhading					
	Makwanpur					
Kathmandu Valley	Kathmandu	Lalitpur	2,517,023	468,132	132	28
	Lalitpur	Kathmandu		1,744,240		104
	Bhaktapur					
Central Tarai	Dhanusa	Bara	4,707,517	687,708	268	56
	Mahottari	Parsa		601,017		50
	Sarlahi	Chitwan		579,984		48
	Rautahat	Mahottari		627,580		52
	Bara	Dhanusa		754,777		62
	Parsa					
	Chitawan					
Western Mount	Manang	Mustang	19,990	No need	18	18
	Mustang					
Western Hill	Gorkha	Parbat	2,811,135	146,590	144	66
	Lamjung	Lamjung		167,724		78
	Tanahu					
	Syangja					
	Kaski					
	Myagdi					
	Parbat					
	Baglung					
	Gulmi					
	Palpa					
	Arghakhanchi					
Western Tarai	Nawalparasi	Rupandehi	2,095,640	880,196	118	68
	Rupandehi	Nawalparasi		643,508		50

	Kapilbastu					
MW Mount	Dolpa Jumla Kalikot Mugu Humla		388,713	No need		
MW Hill	Pyuthan Rolpa Rukum Salyan Surkhet Dailekh Jajarkot	Rolpa Surkhet	1,687,497	224,506 350,804	118	46 72
MW Tarai	Dang Banke Bardiya	Banke Dang	1,470,472	491,313 552,583	82	38 44
FW Mount	Bajura Bajhang Darchula		463,345	No need		
FW Hill	Achham Doti Dadeldhura Baitadi	Achham	862,215	No need	76	76
FW Tarai	Kailali Kanchanpur	Kanchanpur	1,226,957	No need	68	68
Total	75	25	26,494,504		1,500	1,500

APPENDIX C: FULL SAMPLING FRAME (WAVE I)

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District (1st-Stage)	Sample Size (District)	Sample VDC/Mun (2nd-Stage)	Sample Ward (3rd-Stage)	Sample Size (VDC)	Random no for VDC	Random no for ward	Random no for ward
Eastern Mountain	1 .Sankhuwasabha	38	1. Kharang	9, 2	18	14	9	2
			2. Jaljala	5, 2	20	11	5	2
Eastern Hill	2. Panchathar	76	3. Durdimba	6, 5	18	9	6	5
			4. Olane	4, 9	18	24	4	9
			5. Sarang Danda	4, 8	20	34	4	8
			6. Sidin	8, 1	20	35	8	1
Eastern Tarai	3. Morang	94	7. Kadmaha	4, 3	20	33	4	3
			8. Sijuwa	6, 2	20	53	6	2
			9. Madhumalla	7, 8	20	38	7	8
			10. Tandi	7, 1	20	60	7	1
			11. Biratnagar Mun.	16, 18	14		16	18
	4. Siraha	60	12. Sukhachina	1, 7	22	103	1	7
			13. Lagadigoth	2, 3	24	62	2	3
			14. Lahan Mun.	7, 9	14		7	9
	5. Saptari	62	15. Bakdhauwa	8, 7	22	5	8	7
			16. Dhanagadi	7, 8	20	32	7	8
			17. Rajbiraj Mun.	6, 1	20		6	1
Central Mountain	6. Dolkha	46	18. Kalinchowk	9, 2	22	27	9	2
			19. Babare	9, 8	24	2	9	8
Central Hill	7. Kavrepalanchok	100	20. Simalchour Syampati	1, 2	20	84	1	2
			21. Sanowangthali	5, 3	20	77	5	3
			22. Bhumlutar	7, 2	20	9	7	2
			23. Nagre Gagarche	3, 8	20	61	3	8
			24. Dolalghat	9, 3	20	26	9	3
Kathmandu Valley	8. Lalitpur	28	25. Gotikhel	8, 9	14	20	8	9

Region	District		VDC/Municipality					
			26. **Lalitpur Sub-metro.**	10, 18	14		10	18
	9. Kathmandu	104	27. Sundarijal	7, 6	20	53	7	6
			28. Manmaiju	1, 2	22	38	1	2
			29. Balambu	8, 9	20	4	8	9
			30. **Kathmandu metro.**	30, 6, 16, 10	42		30	6
Central Tarai	10. Bara	56	31. Majhariya	1, 7	20	63	1	7
			32. Motisar	6, 3	22	66	6	3
			33. **Kalaiya Mun.**	3, 11	14		3	11
	11. Parsa	50	34. Mainapur (Pakaha)	3, 4	16	49	3	4
			35. Birawaguthi	5, 1	18	21	5	1
			36. **Birgunj Mun.**	11, 3	16		11	3
	12. Chitwan	48	37. Parbatipur	1, 8	16	29	1	8
			38. Madi Kalyanpur	9, 3	18	25	9	3
			39. **Bharatpur Mun.**	4, 13	14		4	13
	13. Mahottari	52	40. Badiya Banchauri	9, 7	18	4	9	7
			41. Damhimarayee	1, 2	20	17	1	2
			42. **Jaleshwor Mun.**	11, 4	14		11	4
	14. Dhanusa	62	43.Thilla Yaduwa	9, 8	22	96	9	8
			44. Aurahi	7, 6	22	2	7	6
			45. **Janakpur Mun.**	15, 1	18		15	1
Western Mount	15. Mustang	18	46. Jomsom	8, 3	18	7	8	3
Western Hill	16. Parbat	66	47. Khaula Lakuri	5, 7	22	29	5	7
			48. Bajung	1, 6	22	4	1	6
			49. Bhangara	2, 4	22	9	2	4
	17. Lamjung	78	50. Chiti	6, 8	20	19	6	8
			51. Bangre	2, 9	18	5	2	9
			52. Ishaneshwor	1, 8	20	33	1	8
			53. Chakratirtha	7,3	20	16	7	3
Western Tarai	18. Rupandehi	68	54. Manpakadi	3, 1	22	45	3	1

			55. Asuraina	7, 4	22	4	7	4
			56. Bishnupura	8, 9	24	11	8	9
	19. Nawalparasi	50	57. Baidauli	8, 2	15	5	8	2
			58. Pragatinagar	5, 4	20	51	5	4
			59. Ramgram Mun.	10, 11	15		10	11
MW Hill	20. Rolapa	46	60. Kotgaun	4, 2	22	29	4	2
			61. Gairigaun	5, 4	24	11	5	4
	21. Surkhet	72	62. Ranibas	8, 3	16	44	8	3
			63. Babiyachaur	1, 5	20	3	1	5
			64. Sahre	3, 1	20	46	3	1
			65. Birendranagar Mun.	10, 1	16		10	1
MW Tarai	22. Banke	38	66. Phattepur	3, 6	22	34	3	6
			67. Nepalgunj Mun.	1, 7	16		1	7
	23. Dang	44	68. Hapur	4, 6	14	15	4	6
			69. Rajpur	3, 6	16	28	3	6
			70. Ghorahi Mun.	7, 4	14		7	4
FW Hill	24. Achham	76	71. Sutar	1, 9	20	68	1	9
			72. Tosi	3, 5	18	72	3	5
			73. Kalikasthan	7, 6	20	38	7	6
			74. Bhagyaswori	6, 1	18	8	6	1
FW Tarai	25. Kanchanpur	68	75. Sankarpur	5, 1	26	17	5	1
			76. Raikawar Bichawa	6, 9	26	14	6	9
			77. Bhimdatta Mun.	18, 15	16		18	15
Total	25	1,500	**62 VDCs and 15 Mun.**		1,500			

76

APPENDIX D- CODEBOOK: WAVE 1 SURVEY

Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: A case study of Nepal

Wave 1 survey instrument and descriptive data

[Instruction for the interviewer: Conduct the interview in an informal, conversational manner, asking questions gently in a soft tone. Put the respondent at ease. Do not proceed in an interrogative manner or intimidate the respondent in any way. Give sufficient time to the respondent to reflect and answer the question without feeling rushed. If the respondent does not understand the questions, repeat it slowly.**]**

    Introduction: Namsakar, my name is _____ and I am from an organization called Interdisciplinary Analyst (IDA). This is an independent research organization based in Kathmandu. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out more on what you feel and think about issues of public interest. We are interested in people's opinions about their local community, relationships with other communities, and their attitudes towards the government of Nepal.

SECTION 1: PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND

QA. **{P2QA}** Area		n	%
Rural	1	1243	82.9
Urban	2	257	17.1
	Total Valid	[1500]	[100.0]
	Don't know	(0)	(0.0)
	Can't say	(0)	(0.0)

QB. **{P2QB}** Sex

		n	%
Female	1	777	51.8
Male	2	723	48.2
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QC. **{P2QC}** Age

		n	%
18-25	1	346	23.1
26-35	2	374	24.9
36-45	3	314	20.9
Above 45	4	466	31.1
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QD. **{P2QC}** Education qualification

		n	%
Illiterate	1	400	26.7
Literate (no formal education)	2	256	17.1
Class passed			
Primary	3	216	14.4
Lower secondary	4	183	12.2
Secondary	5	129	8.6

78

		n	%
SLC	6	156	10.4
Intermediate	7	124	8.3
Bachelor and above	8	36	2.4
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QE. **{P2QE}** What caste/ethnicity do you belong to?

		n	%
Hill Caste	1	462	30.8
Hill Ethnic	2	376	25.1
Hill Dalit	3	107	7.1
Newar	4	74	4.9
Madhesi Caste	5	256	17.1
Terai Madhesi Janajati	6	98	6.5
Madhesi Dalit	7	78	5.2
Muslim	8	49	3.3
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QF. **{P3QF}** Religion

		n	%
Hinduism	1	1181	78.7
Islam	2	53	3.5
Kirat	3	64	4.3
Atheist	4	2	.1
Buddhism	5	170	11.3
Christianity	6	23	1.5
Bon	7	7	.5

	n	%
Total Valid	**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know	**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say	**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QG. **{P3QG}** What is your profession?

		n	%
Agriculture	1	**673**	**44.9**
Business	2	**185**	**12.3**
Service	3	**92**	**6.1**
Labour	4	**81**	**5.4**
Student	5	**115**	**7.7**
House wife/husband	6	**292**	**19.5**
Retired	7	**22**	**1.5**
Unemployed	7	**40**	**2.7**
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QH. **{P4QH}** What is the main source of income to your family?

		n	%
Agriculture	1	**834**	**55.6**
Business	2	**219**	**14.6**
Service	3	**149**	**9.9**
Remittance	4	**137**	**9.1**
Labour	5	**126**	**8.4**
Pension	6	**35**	**2.3**
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QI. **{P4QI}** What is your current marital status?

80

		n	%
Married 1		1261	84.1
Unmarried...2		239	15.9
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QJ. **{P4QJ}** The residence pattern of the various caste/ethnic groups in the locality [show card]

		n	%
Wholly mixed and living in one community 1		510	34.0
Partly mixed and partly separate...2		501	33.4
Nearby but separate 3		369	24.6
At a distance 4		120	8.0
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

Initial introduction to survey and scale:

Throughout this survey, we will pose to you a series of statements, and ask you to rate how much you agree with the statement on a scale of 1 to 5.

<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>

First, we would like to ask about your personal connection to your ethnic/caste group. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

81

Q1. **{P4Q1}** I see myself first and (foremost) as a member of my caste/ethnic group.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.03	n	141	86	175	276	811	11	1500
Std Dev	1.32	%	9.4	5.7	11.7	18.4	54.1	.7	100.0

Q2. **{P5Q2}** I see myself first and (foremost) as a Nepali member of the Nepalese community

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.70	n	23	15	81	150	1229	2	1500
Std Dev	.75	%	1.5	1.0	5.4	10.0	81.9	.1	100.0

Q3. **{P5Q3}** People from my ethnic/caste group should try to keep a separate cultural identity.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.35	n	222	260	279	201	511	27	1500
Std Dev	1.47	%	14.8	17.3	18.6	13.4	34.1	1.8	100.0

Q4. **{P5Q4}** People from my ethnic/caste group should try to remain distinct from the larger Nepalese society..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.75	n	-	13	108	382	297	-	1500
Std Dev	.98	%	-	1.6	13.5	47.8	37.1	-	100.0

Self Group Self Group Self Group Self Group Self Group
A B C D E

Q5. **{P5Q5}**   The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle represents your caste/ethnic group. Could you select a diagram that most closely represents your relationship with your caste/ethnic group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.46	n	18	52	144	288	997	1	1500
Std Dev	.89	%	1.2	3.5	9.6	19.2	66.5	.1	100.0

Q6. **{P5Q6}**   The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle represents Nepal as a national group, i.e., all other Nepalese people. Could you select the diagram that denotes your relationship with your national group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.50	n	6	32	151	331	980	-	1500
Std Dev	.79	%	.4	2.1	10.1	22.1	65.3	-	100.0

83

Q7. **{P5Q7}** The small circle below denotes your caste/ethnic group. The larger circle represents Nepal as a national group, i.e., all other Nepalese people. Could you select the diagram that denotes your caste/ethnic group's relationship with your national group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	4.21	**n**	25	68	220	436	748	3	1500
Std Dev	0.96	**%**	1.7	4.5	14.7	29.1	49.9	.2	100.0

POWER DISTANCE

In this section, we would like to ask some questions about the government, citizens, and power. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the central government, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q8. **{P6Q8}** People are better off not questioning the decisions of those in the government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	1.51	**n**	1050	194	100	34	60	62	1500
Std Dev	1.02	**%**	70.0	12.9	6.7	2.3	4.0	4.1	100.0

Q9. **{P6Q9}** In most situations, authorities should make decisions without consulting citizens.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	1.29	**n**	1154	183	70	17	12	64	1500
Std Dev	.70	**%**	76.7	12.2	4.7	1.1	.8	4.3	100.0

84

Q10. **{P7Q10}** In order for a nation to function, citizens should follow their government's orders without question..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.58	n	932	302	106	41	46	73	1500
Std Dev	0.98	%	62.1	20.1	7.1	2.7	3.1	4.9	100.0

Q11. **{P7Q11}** A government that consults too much with citizens is perceived as weak.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.52	n	974	254	96	30	48	98	1500
Std Dev	.96	%	64.9	16.9	6.4	3.0	2.2	6.5	100.0

Q12. **{P7Q12}** There are few qualities more admirable in a citizen than dedication and loyalty to his/her government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.66	n	99	180	343	284	517	77	1500
Std Dev	1.27	%	6.6	12.0	22.9	18.9	34.5	5.1	100.0

POWER, STATUS, LEGITIMACY, STABILITY

We would like you to think about your caste/ethnic group in comparison to other caste/ethnic groups in Nepal.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

85

Q13. **{P8Q13}**   My ethnic/caste group has the power of influence in society, compared to other ethnic/caste groups.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.62	n	310	380	415	176	143	76	1500
Std Dev	1.23	%	20.7	25.3	27.7	11.7	9.5	5.1	100.0

Q14. **{P8Q14}**   My ethnic/caste group has a high social status compared to other ethnic/caste groups.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.49	n	377	397	392	164	123	47	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	25.1	26.5	26.1	10.9	8.2	3.1	100.0

Q15. **{P8Q15}**   The position of my ethnic/caste group in the social hierarchy is fair..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.84	n	228	353	478	206	184	51	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	15.2	23.5	31.9	13.7	12.3	3.4	100.0

Q16. **{P8Q16}**   The level of influence that my caste/ethnic group has in society is likely to change in the future.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.00	n	158	368	355	244	219	156	1500
Std Dev	1.25	%	10.5	24.7	23.7	16.3	14.6	10.4	100.0

GROUP TRUST

In this section, we will be asking you about your levels of trust in different groups in Nepalese society. Think about how much you trust these different groups in general.

Q17. **{P9Q17}** Hill Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.58	n	58	224	440	312	439	27	1500
Std Dev	1.17	%	3.9	14.9	29.3	20.8	29.3	1.8	100.0

Q18. **{P9Q18}** Hill Ethnic

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.52	n	30	248	451	321	364	86	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	2	16.5	30.1	21.4	24.3	5.7	100.0

Q19. **{P9Q19}** Hill Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.07	n	100	436	399	202	267	96	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	6.7	29.1	26.6	13.5	17.8	6.4	100.0

Q20. **{P9Q20}** Newar

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.80	n	146	500	353	160	180	161	1500
Std Dev	1.19	%	9.7	33.3	23.5	10.7	12.0	10.7	100.0

Q21. {P9Q21} Madhesi Caste			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.65	n	347	414	233	186	216	104	1500
Std Dev	1.38	%	23.1	27.6	15.5	12.4	14.4	6.9	100.0

Q22. {P9Q22} Terai Madhesi Janajati			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.66	n	321	414	279	155	217	114	1500
Std Dev	1.36	%	21.4	27.6	18.6	10.3	14.5	7.6	100.0

Q23. {P9Q23} Madhesi Dalit			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.43	n	375	475	257	115	161	117	1500
Std Dev	1.28	%	25.0	31.7	17.1	7.7	10.7	7.8	100.0

Q24. {P9Q24} Muslim			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.91	n	617	458	1347	51	88	152	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	41.1	30.5	8.9	3.4	5.9	10.1	100.0

Q25. {P9Q25} India			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

88

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.61	**n**	289	396	337	176	139	163	1500
Std Dev	1.24	**%**	19.3	26.4	22.5	11.7	9.3	10.9	100.0

Q26. **{P9Q26}** The UN

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.85	**n**	121	326	332	145	131	445	1500
Std Dev	1.17	**%**	8.1	21.7	22.1	9.7	8.7	29.7	100.0

Q27. **{P9Q27}** The US

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.57	**n**	200	403	364	139	78	316	1500
Std Dev	1.10	**%**	13.3	26.9	24.3	9.3	5.2	21.1	100.0

Q28. **{P9Q28}** China

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.38	**n**	253	437	336	106	53	315	1500
Std Dev	1.05	**%**	16.9	29.1	22.4	7.1	3.5	21.0	100.0

Q29. **{P9Q29}** NGOs

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.91	**n**	80	412	387	188	140	293	1500
Std Dev	1.10	**%**	5.3	27.5	25.8	12.5	9.3	19.5	100.0

Q30. **{P9Q30}** INGOs			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.93	n	91	395	343	217	140	314	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	6.1	26.3	22.9	14.5	9.3	20.9	100.0

GROUP INFLUENCE

We would now like to ask your opinion on the different groups in society and how much influence they have over how the government is run. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

In your opinion, to what extent do the following groups influence how the government is run?

Q31. **{P10Q31}** Hill Caste			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.49	n	42	227	421	386	295	129	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	2.8	15.1	29.1	25.7	19.7	8.6	100.0

Q32. **{P10Q32}** Hill Ethnic			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.11	n	48	312	536	333	109	162	1500
Std Dev	.97	%	3.2	20.8	35.7	22.2	7.3	10.8	100.0

90

Q33. **{P10Q33}**   Hill Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	**Total**
Mean	2.51	**n**	152	289	400	138	52	169	**1500**
Std Dev	.96	**%**	10.1	39.3	26.7	9.2	3.5	11.3	**100.0**

Q34. **{P10Q34}**   Newar

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	**Total**
Mean	2.56	**n**	133	527	414	147	44	235	**1500**
Std Dev	.94	**%**	8.9	35.1	27.6	9.8	2.9	15.7	**100.0**

Q35. **{P10Q35}**   Madhesi Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	**Total**
Mean	3.02	**n**	144	325	370	317	161	183	**1500**
Std Dev	1.18	**%**	9.6	21.7	24.7	21.1	10.7	12.2	**100.0**

Q36. **{P11Q136}**   Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	**Total**
Mean	2.80	**n**	159	403	387	252	106	193	**1500**
Std Dev	1.12	**%**	10.6	26.9	25.8	16.	7.1	12.9	**100.0**

Q37. **{P11Q37}**   Madhesi Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	**Total**

91

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
Mean	**2.36**	**n**	**269**	**526**	**309**	**136**	**51**	**209**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.04**	**%**	**17.9**	**35.1**	**20.6**	**9.1**	**3.4**	**13.9**	**100.0**

Q38. **{P11Q38}**   Muslim

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	**2.07**	**n**	**402**	**521**	**200**	**93**	**42**	**252**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.02**	**%**	**26.8**	**34.7**	**13.3**	**5.5**	**2.8**	**16.8**	**100.0**

Q39. **{P11Q39}**   India

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	**3.42**	**n**	**86**	**234**	**329**	**297**	**317**	**237**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.23**	**%**	**5.7**	**15.6**	**21.9**	**19.8**	**21.1**	**15.8**	**100.0**

Q40. **{P11Q40}**   The UN

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	**2.91**	**n**	**85**	**298**	**360**	**192**	**90**	**475**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.07**	**%**	**5.7**	**19.9**	**24.0**	**12.8**	**6.0**	**31.7**	**100.0**

Q41. **{P11Q41}**   The US

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	**2.91**	**n**	**118**	**308**	**390**	**229**	**104**	**351**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.11**	**%**	**7.9**	**20.5**	**26.0**	**15.3**	**6.9**	**23.4**	**100.0**

Q42. **{P11Q42}** China			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.71	**n**	157	341	398	191	65	348	1500
Std Dev	1.72	**%**	10.5	22.7	26.5	12.7	4.3	23.2	100.0

Q43. **{P11Q43}** NGOs			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.66	**n**	133	383	400	155	55	374	1500
Std Dev	1.01	**%**	8.9	25.5	26.7	10.3	3.7	24.9	100.0

Q44. **{P11Q44}** INGOs			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.71	**n**	124	353	412	170	52	389	1500
Std Dev	1.01	**%**	8.3	23.5	27.5	11.3	3.5	25.9	100.0

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION

We are interested in your opinions about the dominance of particular groups in society.

To what extent do you agree with the following statement?

Q45. **{P11Q45}** It's probably a goo9d thing that some groups are at the top and others are at the bottom   Not at all   A little   Some   Much   Entirely   DK/CS

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.63	n	1020	150	157	69	64	40	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	68.0	10.0	10.5	4.6	4.3	2.7	100.0

VOICE

In these questions, we are interested in your opinion on the extent to which Nepalese people in general are allowed to participate in government decision-making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q46. **{P12Q46}** Nepalese in general are consulted in how the government is run.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.13	n	643	294	218	96	136	112	1500
Std Dev	1.32	%	42.9	19.7	14.5	6.4	9.1	7.5	100.0

Q47. **{P12Q47}** Nepalese in general have the opportunity to participate in the political process.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.62	n	196	479	456	156	104	120	1500
Std Dev	1.08	%	13.1	31.9	30.4	9.7	6.9	8.0	100.0

Q48. **{P12Q48}** Nepalese could initiate change in the government if they wanted.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

94

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.82	**n**	42	190	904	278	564	122	1500
Std Dev	1.19	**%**	2.8	12.7	20.3	18.5	37.6	8.1	100.0

Q49. **{P12Q49}**   I personally have a say in how the government is being developed and run.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.67	**n**	294	408	291	154	200	153	1500
Std Dev	1.33	**%**	19.6	27.2	19.4	10.3	13.3	10.2	100.0

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

We are interested in your opinions on fairness in government decision-making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q47. **{P13Q47}**   The government tries to be fair when making decisions.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.53	**n**	401	337	357	135	172	98	1500
Std Dev	1.32	**%**	26.7	22.5	23.8	9.0	11.5	6.5	100.0

Q48. **{P13Q48}**   The government uses fair procedures when deciding how to handle situations.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.05	**n**	537	444	274	82	56	107	1500
Std Dev	1.08	**%**	35.8	29.6	18.3	5.5	3.7	7.1	100.0

Q49. **{P13Q49}** The government treats people fairly.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.92	n	592	466	279	5	32	81	1500
Std Dev	.975	%	39.5	31.1	18.6	3.3	2.1	5.4	100.0

Q50. **{P13Q50}** The government deals with people respectfully.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.99	n	518	524	290	59	30	79	1500
Std Dev	.962	%	34.5	34.9	19.3	3.9	2.0	5.3	100.0

DISTRIBTUIVE JUSTICE

We are interested in your opinion regarding the equality and fairness in the distribution of government services. Think about distribution of services to your own ethnic/caste group compared to others.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q51. **{P14Q51}** The government sometimes gives people from specific caste/ethnic backgrounds less assistance than they give others.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.17	n	202	226	374	338	264	96	1500
Std Dev	1.31	%	13.5	15.1	24.9	22.5	17.6	6.4	100.0

96

Q52. **{P14Q52}** The government provides a better
service to the rich than to the average citizen.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.33	n	643	237	234	135	209	42	1500
Std Dev	1.46	%	42.9	15.8	15.6	9.0	13.9	2.8	100.0

Q53. **{P14Q53}** My ethnic/caste group receives our
fair share of government help.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.85	n	633	497	251	40	30	49	1500
Std Dev	.94	%	42.2	33.1	16.7	2.7	2.0	3.3	100.0

Q54. **{P14Q54}** The decisions of the government
generally tend to be fair to me individually

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.01	n	472	477	272	60	32	187	1500
Std Dev	.98	%	31.5	31.8	18.1	4.0	2.1	12.5	100.0

LEGITIMACY

We would now like to ask you some questions about your opinions of the government of Nepal. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

97

Q55. **{P15Q55}** I trust the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.83	n	275	321	469	197	212	26	1500
Std Dev	1.28	%	18.3	21.4	31.3	13.1	14.1	1.7	100.0

Q56. **{P15Q56}** The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese people.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.17	n	428	505	362	96	38	71	1500
Std Dev	1.01	%	28.5	33.7	24.1	3.4	2.5	4.7	100.0

Q57. **{P15Q57}** I have confidence in the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.09	n	500	528	279	93	54	46	1500
Std Dev	1.05	%	33.3	35.2	18.6	6.2	3.6	3.1	100.0

Q58. **{P15Q58}** I have great respect for the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.80	n	201	513	339	171	229	47	1500
Std Dev	1.27	%	13.4	34.2	22.6	11.4	15.3	3.1	100.0

LAW LEGITIMACY

These questions will ask about your opinions of the laws the government makes.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q59. **{P15Q59}** I should always obey the law even if it goes against what I think is right

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.41	n	216	124	238	318	566	38	1500
Std Dev	.89	%	14.4	8.3	15.9	21.2	37.7	2.5	100.0

Q60. **{P15Q60}** I feel a moral obligation to obey the law

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.27	n	6	56	199	274	934	31	1500
Std Dev	1.28	%	.4	3.7	13.3	18.3	62.3	2.1	100.0

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

We are interested in your opinions on how the government is performing. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q61. **{P16Q61}** The government has the ability to provide services to the citizens of Nepal.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.27	n	149	234	441	243	333	100	1500
Std Dev	1.28	%	9.9	15.6	29.4	16.2	22.2	6.7	100.0

Q62. **{P16Q62}** The government is able to govern effectively

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.43	**n**	341	389	433	132	78	127	1500
Std Dev	1.13	**%**	22.7	25.9	28.9	8.8	5.2	8.5	100.0

MOTIVATIONAL POSTURES

In these questions we will be asking about your attitude towards to government. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q63. **{P16Q63}** It's important not to let the government push me around..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.95	**n**	343	226	289	193	324	125	1500
Std Dev	1.49	**%**	22.9	15.1	19.3	12.9	21.6	8.3	100.0

Q64. **{P16Q64}** As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against the government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	3.19	**n**	197	249	361	187	355	151	1500
Std Dev	1.38	**%**	13.1	16.6	24.1	12.5	23.7	10.1	100.0

100

Q65. **{P16Q65}** If the government gets tough with me, I will not cooperate with them.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.97	n	274	309	283	184	315	135	1500
Std Dev	1.44	%	18.3	20.6	18.9	12.3	21.0	9.0	100.0

Q66. **{P17Q66}** I care if I am doing the right thing by the government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.68	n	163	94	328	251	561	103	1500
Std Dev	1.36	%	10.9	6.3	21.9	16.7	37.4	6.9	100.0

Q68. **{P17Q68}** The government can't make me obey the law.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.29	n	587	295	239	85	197	97	1500
Std Dev	1.41	%	39.1	19.7	15.9	5.7	13.1	6.5	100.0

Q69. **{P17Q69}** The government has the authority to make decisions on my behalf.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.37	n	173	151	348	415	293	120	1500
Std Dev	1.27	%	11.5	10.1	23.2	27.7	19.5	8.0	100.0

101

Q70. **{P17Q70}** I am interested in how the government operates.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.82	**n**	346	261	333	245	227	88	1500
Std Dev	1.39	**%**	23.1	17.4	22.2	16.3	15.1	5.9	100.0

Q71. **{P17Q71}** I pay attention to what the government wants from me.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.24	**n**	223	129	385	369	268	126	1500
Std Dev	1.31	**%**	14.9	8.6	25.7	24.6	17.9	8.1	100.0

Q72. **{P17Q72}** I don't really know what the government expects of me and I'm not about to seek it out.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.91	**n**	706	309	191	55	96	143	1500
Std Dev	1.20	**%**	47.1	20.6	12.7	3.7	6.4	9.5	100.0

Q72. **{P17Q72}** What the government expects is irrelevant to my life

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.91	**n**	664	359	184	58	82	153	1500
Std Dev	1.15	**%**	44.3	23.9	12.3	3.9	5.5	10.2	100.0

PREFERRED MODEL OF GOVERNMENT

102

Q63. **{P18Q63}**   Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be several separate states with a federal government at the top. To what extent would you support this system of government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		Total
			1	2	3	4	5	9		
Mean	2.70	n	564	60	156	109	352	259		1500
Std Dev	1.73	%	37.6	4.0	10.4	7.3	23.5	17.3		100.0

Q64. **{P18Q64}**   Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be several separate states, each represented by a single ethnic identity, with a federal government at the top. To what extent would you support this system of government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		Total
			1	2	3	4	5	9		
Mean	1.70	n	865	134	93	35	111	262		1500
Std Dev	1.26	%	57.7	8.9	6.2	2.3	7.4	17.5		100.0

Q65. **{P18Q65}**   Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be a single centralized government, without states. To what extent would you support this system of government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		Total
			1	2	3	4	5	9		
Mean	2.78	n	544	114	86	52	438	266		1500
Std Dev	1.80	%	36.6	7.6	5.7	3.5	29.2	17.7		100.0

103

WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT GROUP ACTION

Q66. **{P19Q66}** I would attend a protest to support the rights of my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.74	n	208	125	229	190	726	22	1500
Std Dev	1.48	%	13.9	8.3	15.3	12.7	48.4	1.5	100.0

Q67. **{P19Q67}** I would take up arms to support my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.46	n	641	194	237	116	280	32	1500
Std Dev	1.55	%	42.7	12.9	15.8	7.7	18.7	2.1	100.0

Q68. **{P19Q68}** I would sacrifice my life in support of my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.62	n	581	224	174	123	354	44	1500
Std Dev	1.63	%	38.7	14.9	11.6	8.2	23.6	2.9	100.0

104

Q69. **{P20Q69}** In the present scenario, which political party would you vote for?

		n	%
CPN (Maoist)..1		138	9.2
CPN (M) 2		108	7.2
CPN-M		82	5.5
Nepali Congress...3		304	20.3
Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum...4		52	3.5
TMLP (Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party).......................5		4	.3
Refused 6		107	7.1
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

Q77. **{P20Q77}** Monthly expenditure

		n	%
Less than 5000 1		204	13.6
5001-10000..2		726	48.4
10001-20000..		424	28.3
20001-40000..3		120	8.0
40001-60000..4		9	.6
60000 and more 5		-	-
Refused 6		17	1.1
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

105

APPENDIX E- CODEBOOK: WAVE 2 SURVEY

Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: A case study of Nepal

Wave 2 survey instrument and descriptive data

[Instruction for the interviewer: Conduct the interview in an informal, conversational manner, asking questions gently in a soft tone. Put the respondent at ease. Do not proceed in an interrogative manner or intimidate the respondent in any way. Give sufficient time to the respondent to reflect and answer the question without feeling rushed. If the respondent does not understand the questions, repeat it slowly.**]**

Introduction: Namsakar, my name is _____ and I am from an organization called Interdisciplinary Analyst (IDA). This is an independent research organization based in Kathmandu. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out more on what you feel and think about issues of public interest. We are interested in people's opinions about their local community, relationships with other communities, and their attitudes towards the government of Nepal.

SECTION 1: PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND

QA. **{P2QA}** Area		n	%
Rural 1		1243	82.9
Urban 2		257	17.1
	Total Valid	**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
	Don't know	**(0)**	**(0.0)**
	Can't say	**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QB. **{P2QB}** Sex

		n	%
Female	1	773	51.5
Male	2	727	48.5
	Total Valid	**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
	Don't know	**(0)**	**(0.0)**
	Can't say	**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QC. **{P2QC}** Age

		n	%
18-25	1	327	21.8
26-35	2	380	25.3
36-45	3	324	21.6
Above 45	4	469	31.3
	Total Valid	**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
	Don't know	**(0)**	**(0.0)**
	Can't say	**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QD. **{P2QC}** Education qualification

		n	%
Illiterate	1	392	26.1
Literate (no formal education)	2	252	16.8
Class passed			
Primary	3	171	11.4
Lower secondary	4	189	12.6
Secondary	5	152	10.1

		n	%
SLC	6	150	10.0
Intermediate	7	141	9.4
Bachelor and above	8	53	3.5
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QE. **{P2QE}** What caste/ethnicity do you belong to?

		n	%
Hill Caste	1	547	36.5
Hill Ethnic	2	273	18.2
Hill Dalit	3	75	5.0
Newar	4	70	4.7
Madhesi Caste	5	277	18.5
Terai Madhesi Janajati	6	147	9.8
Madhesi Dalit	7	79	5.3
Muslim	8	32	2.1
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QF. **{P3QF}** Religion

		n	%
Hinduism	1	1303	86.9
Islam	2	31	2.1
Kirat	3	66	4.4
Atheist	4	3	.2
Buddhism	5	75	5.0
Christianity	6	22	1.5
Bon	7	-	-

108

		n	%
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QG. **{P3QG}** What is your profession?

		n	%
Agriculture...1		**803**	**53.5**
Business..2		**179**	**11.9**
Service 3		**112**	**7.5**
Labour..4		**66**	**4.4**
Student...5		**92**	**6.1**
House wife/husband..6		**211**	**14.1**
Retired 7		**9**	**.6**
Unemployed...7		**23**	**1.5**
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QH. **{P4QH}** What is the main source of income to your family?

		n	%
Agriculture...1		**930**	**62.0**
Business..2		**207**	**13.8**
Service 3		**157**	**10.5**
Remittance 4		**85**	**5.7**
Labour..5		**106**	**7.1**
Pension 6		**12**	**.8**
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QI. **{P4QI}** What is your current marital status?

		n	%
Married 1		**1208**	**80.5**
Unmarried...2		**288**	**19.2**
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QJ. **{P4QJ}** The residence pattern of the various caste/ethnic groups in the locality [show card]

		n	%
Wholly mixed and living in one community 1		**559**	**37.3**
Partly mixed and partly separate..2		**574**	**38.3**
Nearby but separate 3		**234**	**15.6**
At a distance 4		**133**	**8.9**
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

Initial introduction to survey and scale:

Throughout this survey, we will pose to you a series of statements, and ask you to rate how much you agree with the statement on a scale of 1 to 5.

IDENTIFICATION

First, we would like to ask about your personal connection to your ethnic/caste group. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q1. **{P4Q1}** I see myself first and (foremost) as a member of my caste/ethnic group.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.28	n	33	52	221	355	836	3	1500
Std Dev	.98	%	2.2	3.5	14.7	23.7	55.7	.2	100.0

Q2. **{P5Q2}** I see myself first and (foremost) as a Nepali member of the Nepalese community

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.68	n	1	10	87	267	1133	2	1500
Std Dev	.62	%	.1	.7	5.8	17.8	75.5	.1	100.0

Q3. **{P5Q3}** People from my ethnic/caste group should try to keep a separate cultural identity.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.08	n	239	284	377	255	311	34	1500
Std Dev	1.37	%	15.9	18.9	25.1	17.0	20.7	2.3	100.0

Q4. **{P5Q4}** People from my ethnic/caste group should try to remain distinct from the larger Nepalese society..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.91	n	793	209	289	96	62	51	1500
Std Dev	1.78	%	52.9	13.9	19.3	6.4	4.3	3.4	100.0

111

Self Group   Self Group   Self Group   Self Group   Self Group

A   B   C   D   E

Q5. **{P5Q5}** The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle represents your caste/ethnic group. Could you select a diagram that most closely represents your relationship with your caste/ethnic group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.58	n	1	29	107	324	1039	-	1500
Std Dev	.71	%	.1	1.9	7.1	21.6	69.3	-	100.0

Q6. **{P5Q6}** The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle represents Nepal as a national group, i.e., all other Nepalese people. Could you select the diagram that denotes your relationship with your national group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.58	n	4	33	122	270	1071	-	1500
Std Dev	.76	%	.3	2.2	8.1	18.0	71.4	-	100.0

112

Q7. **{P5Q7}** The small circle below denotes your caste/ethnic group. The larger circle represents Nepal as a national group, i.e., all other Nepalese people. Could you select the diagram that denotes your caste/ethnic group's relationship with your national group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.54	n	7	50	131	248	1064	-	1500
Std Dev	0.82	%	.5	3.3	8.7	16.5	70.9	-	100.0

POWER, STATUS, LEGITIMACY, STABILITY

We would like you to think about your caste/ethnic group in comparison to other caste/ethnic groups in Nepal.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q8. **{P8Q8}** My ethnic/caste group has the power of influence in society, compared to other ethnic/caste groups.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.89	n	213	343	468	287	161	28	1500
Std Dev	1.20	%	14.2	22.9	31.2	19.1	10.7	1.9	100.0

Q9. **{P8Q9}** My ethnic/caste group has a high social status compared to other ethnic/caste groups.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.71	n	254	383	459	288	85	31	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	16.9	25.5	30.6	19.2	5.7	2.1	100.0

113

Q10. **{P8Q10}** The position of my ethnic/caste group in the social hierarchy is fair..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.78	n	234	355	478	206	184	51	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	15.2	23.5	31.9	13.7	12.3	3.4	100.0

Q11. **{P8Q11}** The level of influence that my caste/ethnic group has in society is likely to change in the future.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.92	n	175	335	397	288	144	161	1500
Std Dev	1.19	%	11.7	22.3	26.5	19.2	6.9	10.7	100.0

GROUP TRUST

In this section, we will be asking you about your levels of trust in different groups in Nepalese society. Think about how much you trust these different groups in general.

Q12. **{P9Q12}** Hill Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.68	n	50	214	396	316	506	18	1500
Std Dev	1.18	%	3.4	14.3	26.4	21.1	33.7	1.2	100.0

Q13. **{P9Q13}** Hill Ethnic

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

114

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.59	n	49	217	454	319	430	31	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	3.3	14.5	30.3	21.3	28.7	2.1	100.0

Q14. **{P9Q14}** Hill Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.24	n	83	345	439	265	294	74	1500
Std Dev	1.19	%	5.5	23.0	29.3	17.7	19.6	4.9	100.0

Q15. **{P9Q15}** Newar

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.57	n	284	436	344	143	138	155	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	18.9	29.1	22.9	9.5	9.2	10.3	100.0

Q16. **{P9Q16}** Madhesi Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.69	n	370	378	198	176	260	118	1500
Std Dev	1.46	%	24.7	25.2	13.2	11.7	19.3	7.9	100.0

Q17. **{P9Q17}** Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.68	n	384	360	199	178	255	124	1500
Std Dev	1.39	%	25.6	24.0	13.3	11.9	17.0	8.3	100.0

115

Q18. **{P9Q18}** Madhesi Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.51	n	419	382	211	165	194	129	1500
Std Dev	1.39	%	27.9	25.5	14.1	11.0	12.9	14.2	100.0

Q19. **{P9Q19}** Muslim

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.98	n	628	376	153	96	87	160	1500
Std Dev	1.21	%	41.9	25.1	10.2	6.4	5.8	10.7	100.0

Q20. **{P9Q20}** India

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.24	n	155	260	363	292	301	129	1500
Std Dev	1.20	%	10.3	17.3	24.4	19.5	20.1	806	100.0

Q21. **{P9Q21}** The UN

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.76	n	157	329	367	182	96	369	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	10.5	21.9	24.5	12.1	6.4	24.6	100.0

Q22. **{P9Q22}** China

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

116

| | Mean | 2.51 | | n | 217 | 410 | 364 | 142 | 57 | 310 | 1500 |
| | Std Dev | 1.14 | | % | 14.5 | 27.3 | 24.3 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 20.7 | 100.0 |

Q23. **{P9Q23}** The US					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.52			n	234	393	328	140	81	324	1500
Std Dev	1.14			%	15.6	26.2	21.9	9.3	5.4	21.6	100.0

Q24. **{P9Q24}** NGOs					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.01			n	99	408	369	233	191	200	1500
Std Dev	1.17			%	6.6	27.2	24.6	15.5	12.7	13.3	100.0

Q25. **{P9Q25}** INGOs					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.64			n	197	380	426	189	68	240	1500
Std Dev	1.08			%	13.1	25.3	28.4	12.6	4.5	16.0	100.0

GROUP INFLUENCE

We would now like to ask your opinion on the different groups in society and how much influence they have over how the government is run. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

In your opinion, to what extent do the following groups influence how the government is run?

Q26. **{P10Q26}** Hill Caste			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.65	**n**	27	167	476	315	403	112	1500
Std Dev	1.09	**%**	1.8	11.1	31.7	21.0	26.9	7.5	100.0

Q27. **{P10Q27}** Hill Ethnic			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.41	**n**	35	261	497	267	316	124	1500
								8.3	
Std Dev	1.11	**%**	2.3	17.4	33.1	17.8	21.1		100.0

Q.28 **{P10Q28}** Hill Dalit			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.98	**n**	104	412	432	209	192	151	1500
Std Dev	1.15	**%**	6.9	27.5	28.8	13.9	12.8	10.1	100.0

Q29. **{P10Q29}** Newar			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.74	**n**	160	418	436	175	114	197	1500
Std Dev	1.10	**%**	10.7	27.9	29.1	11.7	7.6	13.1	100.0

Q30. **{P10Q30}** Madhesi Caste			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

118

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.86	n	174	351	398	306	102	169	1500
Std Dev	1.14	%	11.6	23.4	26.5	20.4	6.8	11.3	100.0

Q31. **{P11Q31}** Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.72	n	227	375	361	275	89	173	1500
Std Dev	1.16	%	15.1	25.0	24.1	18.3	5.9	11.5	100.0

Q32. **{P11Q32}** Madhesi Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.49	n	294	409	359	178	74	186	1500
Std Dev	1.14	%	19.6	27.3	23.9	11.9	4.9	12.4	100.0

Q33. **{P11Q33}** Muslim

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.13	n	433	441	272	91	48	215	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	28.9	29.4	18.1	6.1	3.2	14.3	100.0

Q34. **{P11Q34}** India

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.50	n	74	254	306	283	381	202	1500
								13.5	
Std Dev	1.25	%	4.9	16.9	20.4	18.9	25.4		100.0

119

Q35. **{P11Q35}** The UN

					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.91**			**n**	**85**	**298**	**360**	**192**	**90**	**475**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.07**			**%**	**5.7**	**19.9**	**24.0**	**12.8**	**6.0**	**31.7**	**100.0**

Q36. **{P11Q36}** The US

					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.78**			**n**	**136**	**350**	**405**	**211**	**65**	**333**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.02**			**%**	**9.1**	**23.3**	**27.0**	**14.1**	**4.3**	**22.2**	**100.0**

Q37. **{P11Q37}** China

					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.78**			**n**	**126**	**341**	**438**	**214**	**60**	**321**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.02**			**%**	**8.4**	**22.7**	**29.2**	**14.3**	**4.0**	**21.4**	**100.0**

Q38. **{P11Q38}** NGOs

					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.73**			**n**	**109**	**463**	**376**	**187**	**82**	**283**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.04**			**%**	**7.3**	**30.9**	**25.1**	**12.5**	**5.5**	**18.9**	**100.0**

Q39. **{P11Q39}** INGOs

					Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
					1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

120

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
Mean	2.62	n	154	385	445	172	36	308	1500
Std Dev	1.98	%	10.3	25.7	29.7	11.5	2.4	20.5	100.0

GROUP CONTACT

We would now like to ask your opinion on the different groups in society and how much contact you have with them. How often do you have contact with the following groups?

Q40. **{P11Q40}**   Hill Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.61	n	117	254	280	291	552	6	1500
Std Dev	1.37	%	7.8	16.9	18.7	19.4	36.8	.4	100.0

Q41. **{P11Q41}**   Hill Ethnic

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.42	n	168	250	320	300	453	9	1500
Std Dev	1.36	%	11.2	16.7	21.3	20.0	30.2	.6	100.0

Q42. **{P12Q42}**   Hill Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.00	n	259	344	341	230	313	13	1500
Std Dev	1.38	%	17.3	22.9	22.7	15.3	20.9	.9	100.0

Q43. **{P12Q43}**   Newar

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

121

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.56	n	160	418	436	175	114	197	1500
Std Dev	.94	%	10.7	27.9	29.1	11.7	7.6	13.1	100.0

Q44. **{P12Q44}** Madhesi Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.70	n	464	330	169	143	342	52	1500
Std Dev	1.57	%	30.9	22.0	11.3	9.5	22.8	3.5	100.0

Q45. **{P12Q145}** Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.59	n	514	326	152	147	308	53	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	34.3	21.7	10.1	9.8	20.5	3.5	100.0

Q46. **{P12Q46}** Madhesi Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.38	n	577	327	171	148	219	58	1500
Std Dev	1.04	%	38.5	21.8	11.4	9.9	14.6	3.9	100.0

Q47. **{P12Q47}** Muslim

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.91	n	765	322	170	102	85	56	1500
Std Dev	1.20	%	51.0	21.5	11.3	6.8	5.7	3.7	100.0

122

Q48. **{P13Q48}** India

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		
			1	2	3	4	5	9		Total
Mean	2.65	n	534	216	223	177	299	51		1500
								3.4		
Std Dev	1.54	%	35.6	14.4	14.9	11.8	19.9			100.0

Q49. **{P13Q49}** The UN

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		
			1	2	3	4	5	9		Total
Mean	1.51	n	1001	170	132	63	23	111		1500
Std Dev	.95	%	66.7	11.3	8.8	4.2	1.5	7.4		100.0

Q50. **{P13Q50}** The US

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		
			1	2	3	4	5	9		Total
Mean	1.37	n	1078	195	93	34	8	92		1500
Std Dev	.76	%	71.9	13.0	6.2	2.3	.5	6.1		100.0

Q51. **{P13Q51}** China

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS		
			1	2	3	4	5	9		Total
Mean	1.42	n	1071	172	106	45	17	89		1500
Std Dev	.85	%	71.4	11.5	7.1	3.0	1.1	5.9		100.0

Q52. **{P13Q52}** NGOs

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

123

		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.26	n	537	389	214	174	116	70	1500
Std Dev	1.29	%	35.8	25.9	14.3	11.6	7.7	4.7	100.0

Q53. **{P13Q53}** INGOs

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.76	n	776	325	221	89	14	75	1500
Std Dev	.992	%	51.7	21.7	14.7	5.9	.9	5.0	100.0

VOICE

In these questions, we are interested in your opinion on the extent to which Nepalese people in general are allowed to participate in government decision-making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q54. **{P14Q54}**   Nepalese in general are consulted in how the government is run.

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.32	n	483	319	386	129	99	84	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	32.2	21.3	25.7	8.6	6.6	5.6	100.0

Q55. **{P14Q55}**   Nepalese in general have the opportunity to participate in the political process.

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
	1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

124

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.90	n	190	375	404	259	180	92	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	12.7	25.0	26.9	17.3	12.0	6.1	100.0

Q56. **{P14Q56}** Nepalese could initiate change in the government if they wanted.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.83	n	92	206	324	304	491	83	1500
Std Dev	1.26	%	6.1	13.7	21.6	20.3	32.7	5.5	100.0

Q57. **{P14Q57}** I personally have a say in how the government is being developed and run.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.54	n	209	574	344	134	111	128	1500
Std Dev	1.11	%	13.9	38.3	22.9	8.9	7.4	8.5	100.0

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

We are interested in your opinions on fairness in government decision-making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q58. **{P14Q587}** The government tries to be fair when making decisions.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.36	n	384	370	419	151	53	123	1500
Std Dev	1.11	%	25.6	24.7	27.9	10.1	3.5	8.2	100.0

125

Q59. **{P14Q59}** The government uses fair
procedures when deciding how to handle situations.

			Not at all	**A little**	**Some**	**Much**	**Entirely**	**DK/CS**	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.17	**n**	419	446	347	114	25	149	1500
Std Dev	1.02	**%**	27.9	29.7	23.1	7.6	1.7	9.9	100.0

Q60. **{P14Q60}** The government treats people fairly.

			Not at all	**A little**	**Some**	**Much**	**Entirely**	**DK/CS**	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	1.97	**n**	517	518	281	68	19	97	1500
Std Dev	.94	**%**	34.5	34.5	18.7	4.5	1.3	6.5	100.0

Q61. **{P14Q61}** The government deals with people
respectfully.

			Not at all	**A little**	**Some**	**Much**	**Entirely**	**DK/CS**	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.12	**n**	458	521	304	84	51	82	1500
Std Dev	1.04	**%**	30.5	34.7	20.3	5.6	3.4	5.5	100.0

DISTRIBTUIVE JUSTICE

We are interested in your opinion regarding the equality and fairness in the distribution of government services. Think about distribution of services to your own ethnic/caste group compared to others.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

126

Q62. **{P15Q62}** The government sometimes gives people from specific caste/ethnic backgrounds less assistance than they give others.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.90	n	189	369	438	252	173	79	1500
Std Dev	1.20	%	12.6	24.6	29.2	16.8	11.5	5.3	100.0

Q63. **{P15Q63}** The government provides a better service to the rich than to the average citizen.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.29	n	191	276	301	328	379	25	1500
Std Dev	1.36	%	12.7	18.4	20.1	21.9	25.3	1.7	100.0

Q64. **{P15Q64}** My ethnic/caste group receives our fair share of government help.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.86	n	622	509	246	58	21	44	1500
Std Dev	.93	%	41.5	33.9	16.4	3.9	1.4	2.9	100.0

Q64. **{P15Q64}** The decisions of the government generally tend to be fair to me individually

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.19	n	287	522	378	79	20	214	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	19.1	34.8	25.2	5.3	1.3	14.3	100.0

LEGITIMACY

127

We would now like to ask you some questions about your opinions of the government of Nepal. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q65. **{P15Q65}** I trust the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.79	n	289	320	450	273	157	11	1500
Std Dev	1.24	%	19.3	21.3	30.0	18.2	10.5	0.7	100.0

Q66. **{P15Q66}** The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese people.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.42	n	339	456	456	167	57	25	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	22.6	30.4	30.4	11.1	3.8	1.7	100.0

Q67. **{P15Q67}** I have confidence in the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.19	n	409	577	343	121	36	14	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	27.3	38.5	22.9	8.1	2.4	0.9	100.0

Q67. **{P15Q68}** I have great respect for the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.64	n	270	433	427	277	80	13	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	18.0	28.9	28.5	18.5	5.3	0.9	100.0

128

LAW LEGITIMACY

These questions will ask about your opinions of the laws the government makes.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q69. **{P15Q69}** I should always obey the law even if it goes against what I think is right

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.88	n	94	132	285	315	653	21	1500
Std Dev	1.24	%	6.3	8.8	19.0	21.0	43.5	1.4	100.0

Q70. **{P16Q70}** I feel a moral obligation to obey the law

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.28	n	14	99	205	300	862	20	1500
Std Dev	.99	%	0.9	6.6	13.7	20.0	57.5	1.3	100.0

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

We are interested in your opinions on how the government is performing. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q71. **{P16Q71}** The government is able to govern effectively

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

129

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.61	**n**	287	359	468	206	89	91	1500
Std Dev	1.14	**%**	19.1	23.9	31.2	13.7	5.9	6.1	100.0

Q72. **{P16Q72}**   The government has the ability to deliver basic infrastructure in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.03	**n**	158	372	445	276	225	24	1500
Std Dev	1.21	**%**	10.5	24.8	29.7	18.4	15.0	1.6	100.0

Q73. **{P16Q73}**   The government has the ability to feed the people of Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.61	**n**	303	462	364	195	149	27	1500
Std Dev	1.24	**%**	20.2	30.8	24.3	13.0	9.9	1.8	100.0

Q74. **{P16Q74}**   The government has the ability to provide housing for the people of Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.59	**n**	314	487	311	200	158	30	1500
Std Dev	1.26	**%**	20.9	32.5	30.7	13.3	10.5	2.0	100.0

Q75. **{P16Q75}**   The government has the ability to deliver health services in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.96	**n**	157	413	442	260	203	25	1500
Std Dev	1.19	**%**	10.5	27.5	29.5	17.3	13.5	1.70	100.0

130

Q76. **{P16Q76}**   The government has the ability to
deliver education services in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.15	n	100	355	478	321	225	21	1500
Std Dev	1.14	%	6.7	23.7	31.9	21.4	15.0	1.4	100.0

Q77. **{P17Q77}**   The government has the ability to
control crime in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.50	n	343	466	318	195	118	60	1500
Std Dev	1.21	%	22.9	31.1	21.2	13.0	7.9	4.0	100.0

Q78. **{P17Q78}**   The government has the ability to
manage the economy in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.41	n	320	510	367	138	111	154	1500
Std Dev	1.19	%	21.3	34.0	17.8	9.2	7.4	10.3	100.0

Q79. **{P17Q79}**   The government has the ability to
deal with unemployment in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.99	n	712	327	203	106	92	60	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	47.5	21.8	13.5	7.1	6.1	4.0	100.0

Q80. **{P17Q80}**   The government has the ability to
prevent corruption in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

131

Mean	**2.18**		**n**	**544**	**420**	**216**	**140**	**101**	**79**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.24**		**%**	**36.3**	**28.0**	**14.4**	**9.3**	**6.7**	**5.3**	**100.0**

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND PERFORMANCE

In these questions we will be asking about your attitude towards various political and justice institutions in Nepal.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q81. **{P17Q81}** I trust my local government

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.74**		**n**	**149**	**489**	**521**	**213**	**94**	**34**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.03**		**%**	**9.9**	**32.6**	**34.7**	**14.2**	**6.3**	**2.3**	**100.0**

Q82. **{P17Q82}** I trust my village development committee

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.82**		**n**	**138**	**460**	**536**	**242**	**114**	**10**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.05**		**%**	**9.2**	**30.7**	**35.7**	**16.1**	**7.6**	**0.7**	**100.0**

Q83. **{P17Q83}** I trust the police

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.94**		**n**	**124**	**425**	**511**	**276**	**153**	**11**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.01**		**%**	**8.3**	**28.3**	**24.1**	**18.4**	**10.2**	**0.7**	**100.0**

132

Q84. **{P17Q84}** I trust the Nepalese Army

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.39	n	52	297	419	379	295	58	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	3.5	19.8	27.9	25.3	19.7	3.9	100.0

Q85. **{P18Q85}** I trust the judiciary/courts

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.15	n	104	414	341	278	277	86	1500
Std Dev	1.24	%	6.9	27.6	22.7	18.5	18.5	5.7	100.0

Q86. **{P18Q86}** My local government performs its job effectively

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.64	n	162	490	578	174	57	39	1500
Std Dev	.96	%	10.8	32.7	38.5	11.6	3.8	2.6	100.0

Q87. **{P18Q87}** My village development committee performs its job effectively

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.70	n	161	465	570	233	56	15	1500
Std Dev	.98	%	10.7	31.0	38.0	15.5	3.7	1.0	100.0

Q88. **{P18Q88}** The police perform their job effectively

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

133

		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.92	n	47	394	457	386	255	61	1500
Std Dev	1.05	%	3.1	19.6	30.5	25.7	17.0	4.1	100.0

Q89. **{P18Q89}**   The judiciary/courts performs its
job effectively

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.10	n	97	424	387	24	261	91	1500
Std Dev	1.21	%	6.5	28.3	25.8	16.0	17.4	6.1	100.0

Q90. **{P18Q90}**   If you had a dispute with a
neighbour, who would you trust to settle the dispute?

		Family members	Village/local elder	People in community	Local police	Leader of political party	Local government
		1	2	3	4	5	9
	n	52	742	134	525	6	4
	%	3.5	49.5	8.9	35.0	.4	.3

		Judiciary/ court	Political party	Civil society/NGO	VDC	Paralegal	Nobody
		1	2	3	4	5	9
	n	11	1	3	20	1	1
	%	.7	.1	.2	1.3	.1	.1

MOTIVATIONAL POSTURES

134

In these questions we will be asking about your attitude towards to government. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q91. **{P19Q91}** It's important not to let the government push me around.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.80	n	297	328	380	180	230	85	1500
Std Dev	1.34	%	19.8	21.9	25.3	12.0	15.3	5.7	100.0

Q92. **{P19Q92}** As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against the government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.45	n	439	298	313	151	141	158	1500
Std Dev	1.32	%	29.3	19.9	20.3	10.1	9.4	10.5	100.0

Q93. **{P19Q93}** If the government gets tough with me, I will not cooperate with them.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.78	n	320	362	298	194	247	79	1500
Std Dev	1.39	%	21.3	24.1	19.9	12.9	16.5	5.3	100.0

Q94. **{P19Q94}** I care if I am doing the right thing by the government.

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.04	n	658	288	335	103	59	57	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	43.9	19.2	22.3	6.9	3.9	3.8	100.0

Q95. **{P19Q95}**   The government can't make me obey the law.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.09	n	576	407	289	106	69	53	1500
Std Dev	1.14	%	28.4	27.1	19.3	7.1	4.6	3.5	100.0

Q96. **{P19Q96}**   The government has the authority to make decisions on my behalf.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.81	n	576	407	289	106	69	53	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	38.4	27.1	19.3	7.1	4.6	3.5	100.0

Q97. **{P19Q97}**   I am interested in how the government operates.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.91	n	223	334	408	270	192	73	1500
Std Dev	1.25	%	14.9	22.3	27.2	18.0	12.0	4.9	100.0

Q98. **{P19Q98}** I pay attention to what the government wants from me.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.60	n	285	434	348	188	129	116	1500

136

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
Std Dev	1.21		%	19.0	28.9	23.2	12.5	8.6	7.7	100.0

Q99. **{P19Q99}** I don't really know what the government expects of me and I'm not about to seek it out.

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.89		n	707	330	172	84	73	134	1500
Std Dev	1.16		%	47.1	22.0	11.5	5.6	4.9	8.9	100.0

Q100. **{P19Q100}** What the government expects is irrelevant to my life

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.74		n	770	310	176	53	46	145	1500
Std Dev	1.04		%	51.3	20.7	11.7	3.5	3.1	9.7	100.0

PREFERRED MODEL OF GOVERNMENT

Q101. **{P20Q101}** Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be several separate states with a federal government at the top. To what extent would you support this system of government?

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.27		n	741	63	115	115	246	220	1500
Std Dev	1.64		%	49.4	4.2	7.7	7.7	16.4	14.7	100.0

137

Q102. **{P20Q102}** Some people have proposed a
system of government in Nepal, in which there would
be several separate states, each represented by a single
ethnic identity, with a federal government at the top.
To what extent would you support this system of
government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.63	n	967	60	102	56	92	223	1500
Std Dev	1.23	%	64.5	4.0	6.8	3.7	6.1	14.9	100.0

Q103. **{P20Q103}** Some people have proposed a
system of government in Nepal, in which there would
be a single centralized government, without states. To
what extent would you support this system of
government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.78	n	544	114	86	52	438	266	1500
Std Dev	1.80	%	36.6	7.6	5.7	3.5	29.2	17.7	100.0

WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT GROUP ACTION

Q104. **{P209Q104}** I would attend a protest to
support the rights of my caste/ethnic group

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.53	n	130	242	343	254	514	17	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	8.7	16.1	22.9	16.9	34.3	1.1	100.0

Q105. **{P20Q105}**   I would take up arms to support my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.17	n	714	282	186	99	193	26	1500
Std Dev	1.42	%	47.6	18.8	12.4	6.6	12.9	1.7	100.0

Q106. **{P21Q106}**   I would sacrifice my life in support of my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.01	n	874	186	138	85	193	24	1500
Std Dev	1.47	%	`58.3	12.4	9.2	5.7	12.9	1.6	100.0

WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT GROUP ACTION

Q107. **{P20Q107}**   How would you describe the general level of unrest in your village development region at present, compared to this time last year?

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

139

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.62	n	874	186	138	85	193	24	1500
Std Dev	1.63	%	`58.3	12.4	9.2	5.7	12.9	1.6	100.0

ELECTION
LEGITIMACY

Q108. **{P21Q108}** I am confident an election will be held in the next year

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.84	n	874	186	138	85	193	24	1500
Std Dev	1.30	%	`58.3	12.4	9.2	5.7	12.9	1.6	100.0

Q109. **{P21Q109}** If an election were held in the next year, it would be free and fair of corruption

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.18	n	874	186	138	85	193	24	1500
Std Dev	1.08	%	`58.3	12.4	9.2	5.7	12.9	1.6	100.0

Q110. **{P21Q110}** If an election were held in the next year, the results would be accepted by the people of Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.36	n	120	239	338	344	311	148	1500
Std Dev	1.25	%	8.0	15.9	22.5	22.9	20.7	9.9	100.0

Q111. **{P21Q111}** If an election were held in the next year, the results would be accepted by the major political parties

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.24	n	138	251	354	319	264	174	1500
Std Dev	1.25	%	9.2	16.7	23.6	21.3	17.6	11.6	100.0

Q112. **{P22Q112}** If it were possible, I would return Nepal back to the monarchy

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.28	n	682	156	178	122	215	147	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	45.5	10.4	11.9	8.1	14.3	9.8	100.0

Q113. **{P22Q113}** In the present scenario, which political party would you vote for?

		n	%
CPN - UML 1		214	14.3
CPN (Maoist)...2		78	5.2

141

		n	%
UCPON (Maoist) 3		75	50
Nepali Congress..4		306	20.4
Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum...5		56	3.7
TMLP (Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party).......................6		21	1.4
Refused 7		644	42.9
	Total Valid	**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
	Don't know	**(0)**	**(0.0)**
	Can't say	**(0)**	**(0.0)**

Q114. **{P22Q114}** Monthly expenditure

		n	%
Less than 5000 1		206	13.7
5001-10000..2		524	34.9
10001-20000..		457	30.5
20001-40000..3		265	17.7
40001-60000..4		27	1.8
60000 and more 5		5	.3
Refused 6		16	1.1
	Total Valid	**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
	Don't know	**(0)**	**(0.0)**
	Can't say	**(0)**	**(0.0)**

142

APPENDIX F- CODEBOOK: WAVE 3 SURVEY

Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: A case study of Nepal

Wave 3 survey instrument and descriptive data

[Instruction for the interviewer: Conduct the interview in an informal, conversational manner, asking questions gently in a soft tone. Put the respondent at ease. Do not proceed in an interrogative manner or intimidate the respondent in any way. Give sufficient time to the respondent to reflect and answer the question without feeling rushed. If the respondent does not understand the questions, repeat it slowly.**]**

Introduction: Namsakar, my name is _____ and I am from an organization called Interdisciplinary Analyst (IDA). This is an independent research organization based in Kathmandu. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out more on what you feel and think about issues of public interest. We are interested in people's opinions about their local community, relationships with other communities, and their attitudes towards the government of Nepal.

SECTION 1: PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND

Were you a participant in the survey last year?		n	%
Yes	1	944	62.9
No	2	556	37.1
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

143

QA. **{P2QA}** Area

		n	%
Rural	1	1243	82.9
Urban	2	257	17.1
	Total Valid	[1500]	[100.0]
	Don't know	(0)	(0.0)
	Can't say	(0)	(0.0)

QB. **{P2QB}** Sex

		n	%
Female	1	776	51.7
Male	2	724	48.3
	Total Valid	[1500]	[100.0]
	Don't know	(0)	(0.0)
	Can't say	(0)	(0.0)

QC. **{P2QC}** Age

		n	%
18-25	1	285	19.0
26-35	2	360	24.0
36-45	3	330	22.0
Above 45	4	525	35.0
	Total Valid	[1500]	[100.0]
	Don't know	(0)	(0.0)
	Can't say	(0)	(0.0)

144

QD. **{P2QC}** Education qualification

		n	%
Illiterate...1		376	25.1
Literate (no formal education)..2		259	17.3
Class passed..			
Primary 3		171	11.3
Lower secondary..4		169	11.9
Secondary 5		179	10.2
SLC...6		153	10.7
Intermediate 7		144	9.4
Bachelor and above...8		60	3.5
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QE. **{P2QE}** What caste/ethnicity do you belong to?

		n	%
Hill Caste 1		546	36.6
Hill Ethnic..2		281	18.7
Hill Dalit..3		74	5.0
Newar 4		54	3.6
Madhesi Caste...5		275	18.3
Terai Madhesi Janajati..6		181	12.1
Madhesi Dalit 7		62	4.1
Muslim..8		27	1.8
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QF. **{P3QF}** Religion

		n	%
Hinduism 1		1296	86.4
Islam 2		29	1.9
Kirat...3		64	4.3
Atheist..4		1	.1
Buddhism..5		89	5.9
Christianity 6		21	1.4
Bon 7		-	-
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QG. **{P3QG}** What is your profession?

		n	%
Agriculture...1		747	49.8
Business..2		215	14.3
Service 3		101	6.7
Labour...4		62	4.1
Student..5		97	6.5
House wife/husband..6		242	16.1
Retired 7		15	1.0
Unemployed..7		18	1.2
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QH. **{P4QH}** What is the main source of income to your family?

		n	%
Agriculture...1		899	59.9
Business..2		272	18.1

146

		n	%
Service 3		132	8.8
Remittance 4		85	5.1
Labour...5		93	6.2
Pension 6		28	1.9
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QI. **{P4QI}** What is your current marital status?

		n	%
Married 1		1231	82.1
Unmarried..2		259	17.3
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

QJ. **{P4QJ}** The residence pattern of the various caste/ethnic groups in the locality [show card]

		n	%
Wholly mixed and living in one community 1		539	35.9
Partly mixed and partly separate..2		642	42.8
Nearby but separate 3		217	14.5
At a distance 4		102	6.8
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

Initial introduction to survey and scale: Throughout this survey, we will pose to you a series of statements, and ask you to rate how much you agree with the statement on a scale of 1 to 5.

IDENTIFICATION

First, we would like to ask about your personal connection to your ethnic/caste group. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q1. **{P4Q1}** I see myself first and (foremost) as a member of my caste/ethnic group.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.20	n	33	80	215	378	785	4	1500
Std Dev	1.03	%	2.5	5.3	14.3	25.2	52.3	.3	100.0

Q2. **{P5Q2}** I see myself first and (foremost) as a Nepali member of the Nepalese community

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.70	n	2	13	56	284	1141	4	1500
Std Dev	.59	%	.1	.9	3.7	18.9	76.1	.3	100.0

Q3. **{P5Q3}** People from my ethnic/caste group should try to keep a separate cultural identity.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.23	n	184	278	378	294	247	19	1500
Std Dev	1.33	%	12.3	18.5	25.2	19.6	23.1	1.3	100.0

Q4. **{P5Q4}** People from my ethnic/caste group should try to remain distinct from the larger Nepalese society..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.51	n	793	209	289	96	62	51	1500
Std Dev	1.02	%	52.9	13.9	19.3	6.4	4.3	3.4	100.0

148

Q5. **{P5Q5}**   The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle represents your caste/ethnic group. Could you select a diagram that most closely represents your relationship with your caste/ethnic group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.46	n	12	40	147	351	950	-	1500
Std Dev	.83	%	.8	2.7	9.8	23.4	63.3	-	100.0

Q6. **{P5Q6}**   The small circle below denotes you as an individual. The larger circle represents Nepal as a national group, i.e., all other Nepalese people. Could you select the diagram that denotes your relationship with your national group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.60	n	5	20	121	279	1075	-	1500
Std Dev	.72	%	.3	1.3	8.1	18.6	71.7	-	100.0

149

Q7. **{P5Q7}** The small circle below denotes your caste/ethnic group. The larger circle represents Nepal as a national group, i.e., all other Nepalese people. Could you select the diagram that denotes your caste/ethnic group's relationship with your national group?

			A	B	C	D	E	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.45	n	6	41	172	336	945	-	1500
Std Dev	0.83	%	.4	2.7	11.5	22.4	63.0	-	100.0

POWER, STATUS, LEGITIMACY, STABILITY

We would like you to think about your caste/ethnic group in comparison to other caste/ethnic groups in Nepal.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q8. **{P8Q8}** My ethnic/caste group has the power of influence in society, compared to other ethnic/caste groups.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.12	n	173	268	457	355	220	27	1500
Std Dev	1.21	%	11.5	17.9	30.5	23.7	14.7	1.8	100.0

Q9. **{P8Q9}** My ethnic/caste group has a high social status compared to other ethnic/caste groups.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.96	n	203	284	506	346	139	20	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	13.5	18.9	33.7	23.2	9.3	1.3	100.0

150

Q10. **{P8Q10}** The position of my ethnic/caste group in the social hierarchy is fair..

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.03	n	171	284	498	364	154	29	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	11.4	18.9	33.2	24.3	10.3	1.9	100.0

Q11. **{P8Q11}** The level of influence that my caste/ethnic group has in society is likely to change in the future.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.36	n	74	292	389	351	297	97	1500
Std Dev	1.17	%	4.9	19.5	25.9	23.4	19.8	6.5	100.0

GROUP TRUST

In this section, we will be asking you about your levels of trust in different groups in Nepalese society. Think about how much you trust these different groups in general.

Q12. **{P9Q12}** Hill Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.50	n	44	467	406	416	429	38	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	2.9	11.1	27.1	27.7	28.6	2.5	100.0

Q13. **{P9Q13}** Hill Ethnic

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

151

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.50	n	41	221	226	266	217	109	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	2.7	14.7	29.7	24.4	21.1	7.3	100.0

Q14. **{P9Q14}** Hill Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.02	n	82	413	452	464	171	120	1500
Std Dev	1.10	%	5.5	27.5	30.1	17.5	11.4	8.0	100.0

Q15. **{P9Q15}** Newar

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.69	n	170	428	457	163	185	155	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	11.3	28.5	30.5	10.9	6.5	12.3	100.0

Q16. **{P9Q16}** Madhesi Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.70	n	265	474	338	180	196	47	1500
Std Dev	1.27	%	17.7	31.6	22.5	12.0	13.1	3.1	100.0

Q17. **{P9Q17}** Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.61	n	315	458	315	167	178	67	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	21.0	30.5	21.0	11.1	11.9	4.5	100.0

152

Q18. **{P9Q18}** Madhesi Dalit			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.40	n	409	455	299	129	142	66	1500
Std Dev	1.25	%	27.3	30.3	19.9	8.6	9.5	4.4	100.0

Q19. **{P9Q19}** Muslim			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.03	n	569	472	226	79	76	78	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	37.9	31.5	15.1	5.3	5.1	5.2	100.0

Q20. **{P9Q20}** India			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.11	n	105	276	554	325	158	82	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	7.0	18.4	36.9	21.7	10.5	5.5	100.0

Q21. **{P9Q21}** The UN			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.80	n	84	400	430	189	73	324	1500
Std Dev	1.99	%	5.6	26.7	28.7	12.6	4.9	21.6	100.0

Q22. **{P9Q22}** China			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

153

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
Mean	2.66		n	134	410	471	170	43	272	1500
Std Dev	1.96		%	8.9	27.3	31.4	11.3	2.9	18.1	100.0

Q23. **{P9Q23}** The US

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.58		n	174	415	431	157	46	277	1500
Std Dev	1.06		%	11.6	27.7	28.7	10.5	3.1	18.5	100.0

Q24. **{P9Q24}** NGOs

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.94		n	71	364	532	270	77	186	1500
Std Dev	1.96		%	4.7	24.3	35.5	18.0	5.1	12.4	100.0

Q25. **{P9Q25}** INGOs

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.71		n	108	444	474	180	57	240	1500
Std Dev	.96		%	72	29.6	31.6	12.0	3.8	15.8	100.0

GROUP INFLUENCE

We would now like to ask your opinion on the different groups in society and how much influence they have over how the government is run. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

In your opinion, to what extent do the following groups influence how the government is run?

154

Q26. **{P10Q26}** Hill Caste

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.82	n	18	119	290	656	324	93	1500
Std Dev	.92	%	1.2	7.9	19.3	43.7	21.6	6.2	100.0

Q27. **{P10Q27}** Hill Ethnic

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.13	n	35	280	595	335	97	158	1500
Std Dev	.91	%	2.3	18.7	39.7	22.3	6.5	10.5	100.0

Q.28 **{P10Q28}** Hill Dalit

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.47	n	165	548	443	141	21	182	1500
Std Dev	.90	%	11.0	36.5	29.5	9.4	1.4	12.1	100.0

Q29. **{P10Q29}** Newar

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.74	n	87	428	549	199	35	202	1500
Std Dev	.89	%	5.8	28.5	36.6	13.3	2.3	13.5	100.0

Q30. **{P10Q30}** Madhesi Caste

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

155

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
Mean	2.85	n	118	393	516	269	75	129	1500
Std Dev	1.01	%	7.9	26.2	34.4	17.9	5.0	8.6	100.0

Q31. **{P11Q31}** Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.45	n	247	482	421	149	45	156	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	16.5	32.1	28.1	9.9	3.0	10.4	100.0

Q32. **{P11Q32}** Madhesi Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.13	n	382	561	277	91	32	157	1500
Std Dev	.98	%	25.5	37.4	18.5	6.1	2.1	10.5	100.0

Q33. **{P11Q33}** Muslim

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.92	n	504	537	216	55	22	166	1500
Std Dev	.92	%	33.6	35.8	14.4	3.7	1.5	11.1	100.0

Q34. **{P11Q34}** India

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.67	n	7	147	380	521	257	188	1500
								12.5	
Std Dev	.93	%	.5	9.8	25.3	34.7	17.1		100.0

Q35. **{P11Q35}** The UN

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.95	n	30	326	519	323	46	347	1500
Std Dev	.86	%	2.0	21.7	34.6	15.5	3.1	23.1	100.0

Q36. **{P11Q36}** The US

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.89	n	43	364	486	248	38	321	1500
Std Dev	.88	%	2.9	24.3	32.4	16.5	2.5	21.4	100.0

Q37. **{P11Q37}** China

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.88	n	39	364	513	226	38	320	1500
Std Dev	.86	%	2.6	24.3	34.2	15.1	2.5	21.3	100.0

Q38. **{P11Q38}** NGOs

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.69	n	80	473	465	157	47	278	1500
Std Dev	.91	%	5.3	31.5	31.0	10.5	3.1	18.5	100.0

Q39. **{P11Q39}** INGOs

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
	1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

157

| | | | Mean | 2.68 | | n | 43 | 510 | 457 | 154 | 30 | 306 | 1500 |

Mean	2.68		n	43	510	457	154	30	306	1500
Std Dev	.83		%	2.9	34.0	30.5	10.3	2.0	20.4	100.0

GROUP CONTACT

We would now like to ask your opinion on the different groups in society and how much contact you have with them. How often do you have contact with the following groups?

Q40. **{P11Q40}**   Hill Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.65	n	124	200	290	341	539	6	1500
Std Dev	1.31	%	8.3	13.3	19.3	22.7	35.9	.4	100.0

Q41. **{P11Q41}**   Hill Ethnic

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.28	n	203	282	305	272	419	19	1500
Std Dev	1.40	%	13.5	18.8	20.3	18.1	27.9	1.3	100.0

Q42. **{P12Q42}**   Hill Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.81	n	284	398	333	239	224	22	1500
Std Dev	1.33	%	18.9	26.5	22.2	15.9	14.9	1.5	100.0

Q43. **{P12Q43}**   Newar

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

158

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.18**	**n**	**529**	**460**	**271**	**120**	**95**	**25**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.19**	**%**	**35.3**	**30.7**	**18.1**	**8.0**	**6.3**	**1.7**	**100.0**

Q44. **{P12Q44}**   Madhesi Caste

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.70**	**n**	**318**	**468**	**184**	**136**	**380**	**14**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.57**	**%**	**21.2**	**31.2**	**12.3**	**9.1**	**25.3**	**.9**	**100.0**

Q45. **{P12Q145}**   Terai Madhesi Janajati

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.59**	**n**	**471**	**378**	**177**	**129**	**321**	**24**	**`1500**
Std Dev	**1.15**	**%**	**31.4**	**25.2**	**11.8**	**8.6**	**21.4**	**1.6**	**100.0**

Q46. **{P12Q46}**   Madhesi Dalit

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.42**	**n**	**568**	**372**	**154**	**99**	**277**	**30**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.51**	**%**	**37.9**	**24.8**	**10.6**	**6.6**	**18.5**	**2.0**	**100.0**

Q47. **{P12Q47}**   Muslim

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.01**	**n**	**707**	**409**	**161**	**45**	**157**	**21**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.29**	**%**	**47.1**	**27.3**	**10.7**	**3.0**	**10.5**	**1.4**	**100.0**

Q48. **{P13Q48}** India

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.36	n	556	267	313	227	104	33	1500
Std Dev	1.31	%	37.1	17.8	20.9	15.1	6.9	2.2	100.0

Q49. **{P13Q49}** The UN

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.35	n	1054	227	84	24	2	99	1500
Std Dev	.69	%	70.3	15.1	6.3	1.6	.1	6.6	100.0

Q50. **{P13Q50}** The US

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.28	n	1132	200	72	12	3	81	1500
Std Dev	.61	%	75.5	13.3	4.8	.8	.2	5.4	100.0

Q51. **{P13Q51}** China

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.27	n	1138	197	68	12	3	82	1500
Std Dev	.60	%	75.9	13.1	4.5	.8	.2	5.5	100.0

Q52. **{P13Q52}** NGOs

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.11**	**n**	**443**	**568**	**282**	**115**	**31**	**61**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.03**	**%**	**29.5**	**37.9**	**18.8**	**7.7**	**2.1**	**4.1**	**100.0**

Q53. **{P13Q53}**   INGOs

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**1.70**	**n**	**725**	**478**	**168**	**55**	**5**	**69**	**1500**
Std Dev	**.84**	**%**	**48.3**	**31.9**	**11.2**	**3.7**	**.3**	**4.6**	**100.0**

VOICE

In these questions, we are interested in your opinion on the extent to which Nepalese people in general are allowed to participate in government decision-making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q54. **{P14Q54}**   Nepalese in general are consulted in how the government is run.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	**2.32**	**n**	**411**	**337**	**408**	**145**	**46**	**153**	**1500**
Std Dev	**1.22**	**%**	**27.4**	**22.5**	**27.2**	**9.77**	**3.1**	**10.2**	**100.0**

Q55. **{P14Q55}**   Nepalese in general have the opportunity to participate in the political process.

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.91	n	113	396	504	276	108	100	1500
Std Dev	1.05	%	7.5	26.4	33.6	18.6	7.2	6.7	100.0

Q56. **{P14Q56}**   Nepalese could initiate change in the government if they wanted.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.61	n	32	200	412	396	363	97	1500
Std Dev	1.08	%	2.1	13.3	27.5	26.4	24.2	6.5	100.0

Q57. **{P14Q57}**   I personally have a say in how the government is being developed and run.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.47	n	251	506	431	164	50	98	1500
Std Dev	1.02	%	16.7	33.7	28.7	10.9	3.3	6.5	100.0

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

We are interested in your opinions on fairness in government decision-making. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q58. **{P14Q587}**   The government tries to be fair when making decisions.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.54	n	266	383	502	194	41	114	1500
Std Dev	1.04	%	17.7	25.5	33.5	12.9	2.7	7.6	100.0

162

Q59. **{P14Q59}**   The government uses fair
procedures when deciding how to handle situations.

			Not at all	**A little**	**Some**	**Much**	**Entirely**	**DK/CS**	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.29	**n**	285	557	393	112	21	132	1500
Std Dev	.937	**%**	19.0	37.1	26.2	7.5	1.4	8.8	100.0

Q60. **{P14Q60}**   The government treats people fairly.

			Not at all	**A little**	**Some**	**Much**	**Entirely**	**DK/CS**	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.17	**n**	404	510	397	104	13	72	1500
Std Dev	.95	**%**	2.9	34.0	26.5	6.9	.9	4.8	100.0

Q61. **{P14Q61}**   The government deals with people
respectfully.

			Not at all	**A little**	**Some**	**Much**	**Entirely**	**DK/CS**	
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**9**	**Total**
Mean	2.32	**n**	324	520	431	135	30	60	1500
Std Dev	.99	**%**	21.6	34.7	28.7	9.0	2.0	4.0	100.0

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

We are interested in your opinion regarding the equality and fairness in the distribution of government services. Think about distribution of services to your own ethnic/caste group compared to others.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

163

Q62. **{P15Q62}** The government sometimes gives people from specific caste/ethnic backgrounds less assistance than they give others.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.31	n	157	187	413	404	274	65	1500
Std Dev	1.23	%	10.5	12.5	27.5	26.9	18.3	4.3	100.0

Q63. **{P15Q63}** The government provides a better service to the rich than to the average citizen.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.45	n	150	201	341	360	396	52	1500
Std Dev	1.30	%	10.0	13.4	22.7	24.0	26.4	3.5	100.0

Q64. **{P15Q64}** My ethnic/caste group receives our fair share of government help.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.10	n	428	584	322	83	29	54	1500
Std Dev	.95	%	28.5	38.9	21.5	5.5	1.9	3.6	100.0

Q64. **{P15Q64}** The decisions of the government generally tend to be fair to me individually

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.29	n	259	587	394	91	27	142	1500
Std Dev	.91	%	17.3	39.1	26.3	6.1	1.8	9.5	100.0

LEGITIMACY

164

We would now like to ask you some questions about your opinions of the government of Nepal. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q65. **{P15Q65}** I trust the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.09	n	112	274	607	362	133	12	1500
Std Dev	.918	%	7.5	18.3	40.5	24.1	8.9	.8	100.0

Q66. **{P15Q66}** The government operates in the best interests of Nepalese people.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.63	n	198	491	499	204	69	39	1500
Std Dev	1.03	%	13.2	32.7	33.3	13.6	4.6	2.6	100.0

Q67. **{P15Q67}** I have confidence in the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.46	n	225	539	495	145	36	60	1500
Std Dev	.956	%	15.0	35.9	33.0	9.7	2.4	4.0	100.0

Q67. **{P15Q68}** I have great respect for the government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.23	n	80	304	460	455	170	31	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	5.3	20.3	30.7	30.3	11.3	2.1	100.0

165

LAW LEGITIMACY

These questions will ask about your opinions of the laws the government makes.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q69. **{P15Q69}**   I should always obey the law even if it goes against what I think is right

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.80	n	98	120	292	442	532	16	1500
Std Dev	1.19	%	6.5	8.0	19.5	29.5	35.5	1.1	100.0

Q70. **{P16Q70}**   I feel a moral obligation to obey the law

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	4.47	n	3	27	133	434	897	6	1500
Std Dev	.78	%	.2	1.8	8.9	28.9	59.8	.4	100.0

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

We are interested in your opinions on how the government is performing. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q71. **{P16Q71}**   The government is able to govern effectively

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

166

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.89	n	178	290	540	283	107	102	1500
Std Dev	1.10	%	11.9	19.3	36.0	18.9	7.1	6.8	100.0

Q72. **{P16Q72}** The government has the ability to deliver basic infrastructure in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.93	n	141	393	499	297	135	35	1500
Std Dev	1.10	%	9.4	26.2	33.3	19.8	9.0	2.3	100.0

Q73. **{P16Q73}** The government has the ability to feed the people of Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.41	n	369	469	371	164	89	38	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	24.6	31.3	24.7	10.9	5.9	2.5	100.0

Q74. **{P16Q74}** The government has the ability to provide housing for the people of Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.50	n	308	492	376	190	96	38	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	20.5	32.8	25.1	12.7	6.4	2.5	100.0

Q75. **{P16Q75}** The government has the ability to deliver health services in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.00	n	142	333	521	353	132	19	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	9.5	22.2	34.7	23.5	8.8	1.3	100.0

Q76. **{P16Q76}** The government has the ability to deliver education services in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.22	n	67	266	575	422	151	19	1500
Std Dev	1.00	%	4.5	17.7	38.3	28.1	10.1	1.3	100.0

Q77. **{P17Q77}** The government has the ability to control crime in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.68	n	228	449	405	237	103	78	1500
Std Dev	1.14	%	15.2	29.9	27.0	15.8	6.9	5.2	100.0

Q78. **{P17Q78}** The government has the ability to manage the economy in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.62	n	186	468	390	186	76	194	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	12.4	31.2	26.0	12.4	5.1	12.9	100.0

Q79. **{P17Q79}** The government has the ability to deal with unemployment in Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.93	n	658	446	219	96	46	35	1500
Std Dev	1.06	%	43.9	29.7	14.6	6.4	3.1	2.3	100.0

Q80. **{P17Q80}** The government has the ability to prevent corruption in Nepal

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
		1	2	3	4	5	9	Total

			Mean	2.23		n	444	474	486	437	71	88	1500
			Std Dev	1.14		%	29.6	31.6	19.1	9.1	4.7	5.9	100.0

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND PERFORMANCE

In these questions we will be asking about your attitude towards various political and justice institutions in Nepal.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q81. **{P17Q81}** I trust my local government

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.01	n	85	310	638	350	7	43	1500
Std Dev	.94	%	5.7	20.7	42.5	23.3	4.9	2.9	100.0

Q82. **{P17Q82}** I trust my village development committee

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.13	n	71	278	635	407	103	6	1500
Std Dev	.95	%	4.7	18.5	42.3	27.1	6.9	.4	100.0

Q83. **{P17Q83}** I trust the police

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.05	n	101	369	530	343	152	5	1500
Std Dev	1.07	%	6.7	24.6	35.3	22.9	10.1	.3	100.0

169

Q84. **{P17Q84}** I trust the Nepalese Army

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.47	n	50	255	423	447	303	22	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	3.3	17.0	28.6	29.8	20.2	1.5	100.0

Q85. **{P18Q85}** I trust the judiciary/courts

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.32	n	73	276	471	365	261	54	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	4.9	18.4	31.4	24.3	17.4	3.6	100.0

Q86. **{P18Q86}** My local government performs its job effectively

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.90	n	112	311	680	287	54	56	1500
Std Dev	.93	%	7.5	20.7	45.3	19.1	3.6	3.7	100.0

Q87. **{P18Q87}** My village development committee performs its job effectively

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.01	n	102	295	647	367	71	18	1500
Std Dev	.95	%	6.8	19.7	43.1	24.5	4.7	1.2	100.0

Q88. **{P18Q88}** The police perform their job effectively

	Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

170

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.04	**n**	93	371	558	315	152	11	1500
Std Dev	1.05	**%**	6.2	24.7	37.2	21.0	10.1	.7	100.0

Q89. **{P18Q89}**   The judiciary/courts performs its job effectively

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.28	**n**	52	237	443	431	267	70	1500
Std Dev	1.09	**%**	3.5	15.8	29.5	28.7	17.8	4.7	100.0

Q90. **{P18Q90}**   If you had a dispute with a neighbour, who would you trust to settle the dispute?

	Family members	Village/local elder	People in community	Local police	Leader of political party	Local government
	1	2	3	4	5	9
n	89	687	221	442	13	2
%	5.9	45.8	14.7	29.5	.1	.1

	Judiciary/court	Political party	Civil society/NGO	VDC	Mother's group	Nobody
	1	2	3	4	5	9
n	-	2	-	24	6	9
%	-	.1	-	1.3	.4	.6

MOTIVATIONAL POSTURES

In these questions we will be asking about your attitude towards to government. When we ask about the government, we would like you to think about the government in terms of the way in which the central government operates and makes decisions, regardless of which political party is leading the government.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q91. **{P19Q91}** It's important not to let the government push me around.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.89	n	249	295	429	233	204	90	1500
Std Dev	1.28	%	16.6	19.7	28.6	1.5	13.6	6.0	100.0

Q92. **{P19Q92}** As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against the government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.32	n	558	259	290	188	112	93	1500
Std Dev	1.32	%	37.2	17.3	19.3	12.5	7.5	6.2	100.0

Q93. **{P19Q93}** If the government gets tough with me, I will not cooperate with them.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.42	n	455	385	288	127	169	76	1500
Std Dev	1.32	%	30.3	25.7	19.2	8.5	11.3	5.1	100.0

Q94. **{P19Q94}** I care if I am doing the right thing by the government.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

72

172

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.66	n	918	225	206	62	33	56	1500
Std Dev	1.02	%	30.3	25.7	19.2	8.5	11.3	5.1	100.0

Q95. **{P19Q95}**   The government can't make me obey the law.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.79	n	784	349	200	65	50	52	1500
Std Dev	1.06	%	52.3	23.3	13.3	4.3	3.3	3.5	100.0

Q96. **{P19Q96}**   The government has the authority to make decisions on my behalf.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.89	n	136	392	554	233	135	50	1500
Std Dev	1.08	%	9.1	26.1	36.9	15.5	9.0	3.3	100.0

Q97. **{P19Q97}**   I am interested in how the government operates.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.90	n	216	341	434	290	170	49	1500
Std Dev	1.22	%	14.4	22.7	28.9	19.3	11.3	3.3	100.0

Q98. **{P19Q98}** I pay attention to what the government wants from me.

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.59	n	307	378	441	223	87	64	1500

173

	Std Dev	1.16	%	20.5	25.2	29.4	14.9	5.8	4.3	100.0

Q99. **{P19Q99}**   I don't really know what the government expects of me and I'm not about to seek it out.

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.98		n	755	271	181	135	91	67	1500
Std Dev	1.26		%	50.3	18.1	21.1	9.0	6.1	4.5	100.0

Q100. **{P19Q100}**   What the government expects is irrelevant to my life

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.71		n	784	76	162	109	209	160	1500
Std Dev	1.07		%	52.3	5.1	10.8	7.3	13.9	10.7	100.0

PREFERRED MODEL OF GOVERNMENT

Q101. **{P20Q101}**   Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be several separate states with a federal government at the top. To what extent would you support this system of government?

				Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
				1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.17		n	1059	72	84	57	63	165	1500
Std Dev	1.55		%	70.6	4.8	5.6	3.8	4.2	11.0	100.0

74

Q102. **{P20Q102}** Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be several separate states, each represented by a single ethnic identity, with a federal government at the top. To what extent would you support this system of government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.50	n	967	60	102	56	92	223	1500
Std Dev	1.09	%	64.5	4.0	6.8	3.7	6.1	14.9	100.0

Q103. **{P20Q103}** Some people have proposed a system of government in Nepal, in which there would be a single centralized government, without states. To what extent would you support this system of government?

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.78	n	544	114	86	52	438	266	1500
Std Dev	1.80	%	36.6	7.6	5.7	3.5	29.2	17.7	100.0

WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT GROUP ACTION

Q104. **{P209Q104}** I would attend a protest to support the rights of my caste/ethnic group

		Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS

75

175

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.35	n	209	205	327	335	407	17	1500
Std Dev	1.13	%	13.9	13.7	21.8	22.3	27.1	1.1	100.0

Q105. **{P20Q105}** I would take up arms to support my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.82	n	952	164	149	99	111	25	1500
Std Dev	1.28	%	63.5	10.9	9.9	6.6	7.4	1.7	100.0

Q106. **{P21Q106}** I would sacrifice my life in support of my caste/ethnic group

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	1.87	n	944	145	156	102	129	24	1500
Std Dev	1.33	%	`62.9	9.7	10.4	6.8	8.6	1.6	100.0

LOCAL UNREST

Q107. **{P20Q107}** How would you describe the general level of unrest in your village development region at present, compared to this time last year?

	Not at all	Much less	Slightly less	Same	Slightly more	Much more

			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.02	n	375	812	224	74	3	5	1500
Std Dev	.82	%	25.0	54.1	14.9	4.9	.2	.3	100.0

ELECTION
LEGITIMACY

Q108. **{P21Q108}** I am satisfied with the outcome of the elections

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.83	n	36	193	483	392	215	181	1500
Std Dev	1.16	%	2.4	12.9	32.2	26.1	14.3	12.1	100.0

Q109. **{P21Q109}** The election was free and fair of corruption

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.75	n	75	101	315	462	407	140	1500
Std Dev	1.12	%	5.0	6.7	21.0	30.8	27.1	9.3	100.0

177

Q110. **{P21Q110}** The election results have been
accepted by the people of Nepal

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.66	n	19	125	444	510	284	118	1500
Std Dev	.94	%	1.3	8.3	29.6	34.0	18.9	7.9	100.0

Q111. **{P21Q111}** The election results have been
accepted by the major political parties

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.42	n	36	193	483	392	215	181	1500
Std Dev	1.01	%	2.4	12.9	32.2	26.1	14.3	12.1	100.0

Q112. **{P22Q112}** If it were possible, I would return
Nepal back to the monarchy

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.28	n	708	179	167	192	185	69	1500
Std Dev	1.15	%	47.2	11.9	11.1	12.8	12.3	4.6	100.0

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

178

Q113. **{P229Q13}** Human rights abuses were committed during the war

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	3.82	n	76	67	290	484	415	168	1500
Std Dev	1.10	%	5.1	4.5	19.3	32.3	27.7	11.2	100.0

Q114. **{P22Q114}** I am satisfied with the processes put in place to deal with the human rights abuses committed during the war

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
								298	
Mean	2.37	n	214	480	389	89	30		1500
Std Dev	.94	%	14.3	32.0	25.9	5.9	2.0	19.9	100.0

Q115. **{P23Q115}** People who committed human rights abuses during the war have been held accountable

			Not at all	A little	Some	Much	Entirely	DK/CS	
			1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
Mean	2.14	n	313	462	338	70	2	315	1500
Std Dev	.88	%	20.9	30.8	22.5	4.7	.1	21.0	100.0

Q116. **{P23Q116}** In the present scenario, which political party would you vote for?

		n	%
CPN - UML	1	280	18.7
CPN (Maoist)	2	82	5.5
UCPON (Maoist)	3	73	4.9

		n	%
Nepali Congress...4		463	30.9
Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum...5		57	3.8
TMLP (Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party).......................6		21	1.4
Refused..7		414	27.6
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**

Q117. **{P23Q117}** Monthly expenditure

		n	%
Less than 5000 1		128	8.5
5001-10000...2		633	42.2
10001-20000...		517	34.5
20001-40000...3		181	12.1
40001-60000...4		9	.6
60000 and more 5		2	.1
Refused..6		30	2.0
Total Valid		**[1500]**	**[100.0]**
Don't know		**(0)**	**(0.0)**
Can't say		**(0)**	**(0.0)**